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Foreword
 Harmful use of alcohol represents one of the most important risk factors for the 
global burden of disease and injuries. Alcohol consumption is a causal factor in over 200 
health conditions, including mental and behavioural disorders and major noncommunicable 
diseases (NCDs), as well as road traffic crashes, violence and suicides. The harmful use 
of alcohol also has a significant impact on development and treatment outcomes of some 
major infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. We are also beginning to 
obtain a better understanding of the impact that harmful use of alcohol can have on 
people other than the drinker, and sometimes this impact is devastating. 
 To reduce this burden, governments need to develop and implement evidence-based 
and ethically sound strategies and interventions. WHO is committed to assisting countries 
in this task. In 2010, the World Health Assembly approved a resolution endorsing WHO’ s 
“Global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol”. The resolution urges countries to 
strengthen national responses to public health problems caused by the harmful use of 
alcohol. WHO’s “Global action plan for the prevention and control of NCDs 2013-2020” 
includes harmful use of alcohol as one of the four key risk factors for NCDs and calls for 
at least 10% relative reduction in the harmful use of alcohol. 
 The inclusion of a target to strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance 
abuse, including harmful use of alcohol, under the health goal in the United Nations’ 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development further illustrates and acknowledges the importance 
of reducing the harmful use of alcohol for development of our societies. 
 In the global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol, pricing policies represent 
one of the key areas recommended for governments to use. WHO’s NCD action plan con-
tains a menu of policy options and cost-effective interventions to assist Member States 
to implement actions for prevention and control of major NCDs. An updated list of the 
most effective and complementary policy options recommends increasing excise taxes on 
alcoholic beverages as one of the most cost-effective interventions governments can use. 
 This resource tool is developed under a Memorandum of Understanding between 
ThaiHealth and WHO as a part of a broader effort by WHO to develop technical tools and 
resource materials in support of implementation of the global strategy to reduce the 
harmful use of alcohol. We are grateful for the longstanding collaboration and dedication 
of ThaiHealth. I hope that this resource tool will contribute to enhancing knowledge and 
competence relating to taxation and pricing policies among public health professionals 
and alcohol-control policy advocates. This will enable them to more effectively ensure for 
the inclusion of key public health perspectives in the design and implementation of alcohol 
taxation and pricing policies.
Shekhar Saxena
Director, Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse
World Health Organization
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 Literature has collectively illustrated the effectiveness of taxation and pricing 
policies in controlling public health problems caused by alcohol. Indeed, this knowledge 
led the World Health Organization (WHO) to include taxation and pricing control measures 
among the recommended policies in its Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of 
Alcohol. Such awareness also has led public health personnel and non-economist alcohol 
control policy advocates increasingly to support alcohol taxation and pricing policies. 
However, designing and implementing alcohol taxation and pricing policies are normally 
in the hands of finance personnel, who are usually concerned with public finance rather 
than public health perspectives. Thus, this resource tool is designed to inform public health 
personnel and non-economist alcohol control policy advocates how to facilitate effective 
discussions and negotiations with financial officers. The goal is to integrate public health 
perspectives into taxation and pricing policy design and implementation. Thus, this resource 
tool explains relevant economic concepts and provides evidence of effective public health 
policies to augment the understanding of taxation and pricing policies by public health 
personnel and non-economist alcohol policy advocates.
 Alcohol taxation and pricing policies have several public health, economic and 
social benefits as they have the capacity to: 1) generate tax revenue, 2) reduce alcohol 
consumption and associated harms (covering both externalities and internalities) among 
various groups, including young people and heavy drinkers, and 3) prevent the initiation 
of drinking, which is an important preventive strategy in low-and middle-income countries 
that have a high prevalence of lifetime abstainers. Even though controversy still surrounds 
whether taxation should be imposed on social drinking or only on the harmful use of 
alcohol, there are several reasons to support government action to apply taxation to 
general alcoholic beverages to control the problems which result from harmful alcohol 
use.
 This resource tool explains a number of important basic economic concepts, 
including: demand-supply equilibrium, price mechanisms of taxation and minimum price, 
price and tax elasticity, price and demand under different market structures, short-run 
and long-run reactions of the alcohol market associated with changes in taxation and 
pricing policies, alcohol excise tax, custom tax and general tax, basic notions related to 
the structure of an alcoholic beverage, and a limitation of the economic model. Alcohol 
consumption and control by taxation and pricing policies operate via a demand-supply 
equilibrium mechanism, with elements related to price increases, consumption decreases, 
price decreases, and consumption increases. However, the effects of taxation and pricing 
policies vary depending on different market structures and the lag time to measure the 
effects after implementation. In order to target alcoholic beverages specifically to generate 
tax revenue or control consumption, excise tax is the best tool the government can use, 
as compared to custom tax and general tax.
Executive summary
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 Several types of alcohol excise taxation methods are employed around the world. 
These include uniform tax methods – such as specific taxation (where the tax is calculated 
based on the amount of ethanol a beverage contains), ad valorem taxation (where the 
tax is based on the price of the alcoholic beverage) and unitary taxation (where the tax 
is based on the volume of the alcoholic beverage) – and combination tax methods (a 
combination of two or more of the basic taxation methods) – such as mixed specific and 
ad valorem taxation and ad valorem with specific floor taxation. These methods have 
different attributes that may be appropriate to different contexts and different alcohol 
control objectives.
 Governments should take three goals into account when considering an alcohol 
excise taxation model: 1) tax revenue generation, 2) control of alcohol consumption and 
public health problems caused by alcohol consumption, and 3) prevention of drinking 
initiation (for countries with a high prevalence of lifetime abstention). Assessments based 
on these three goals show that specific taxation may be appropriate for high-income 
countries that have a high prevalence of drinkers since it promotes consumption 
of beverages with low alcohol content instead of beverages with high alcohol content, 
resulting in a reduction in total alcohol consumption. Ad valorem with specific floor taxation 
and mixed specific and ad valorem taxation may be appropriate for low- and middle-income 
countries since they promote consumption of medium alcohol content beverages, which 
are expected to reduce total alcohol consumption among heavy drinkers and prevent 
drinking initiation among young people. The government may apply a minimum price 
measure to control problems caused by inexpensive alcoholic beverages.
 Two indicators are used to assess the extent of a tax rate – i.e. the tax due as a 
percentage of the retail price and the tax due per unit of ethanol. The former indicator 
is better at measuring tax incidence (which measures the tax burden on the distribution 
of income), while the latter is better at measuring how much tax burden is imposed on 
each unit of ethanol. Both indicators should be applied in comparisons of alcohol excise 
tax rates between countries.
 Alcohol taxation methods vary at global and country-based levels, as individual 
provinces, regions and states take different approaches to alcohol taxation. The 2012 
Global Survey on Alcohol and Health found that 11 countries did not tax beer, 28 countries 
did not tax wine, and 15 countries did not tax spirits; many of these countries do not tax 
alcohol for historical reasons. Additionally, the excise taxation methods vary considerably 
by country and, in several cases, within countries. Thus, there is a need to determine 
which types of taxation methods work best, taking into account a variety of differing 
circumstances between countries and within individual countries.
 To advocate for alcohol taxation and pricing policies, public health personnel and 
non-economist alcohol control policy advocates should understand general implementation 
issues relating to taxation and pricing policies. Alcohol excise duties are typically collected 
by Customs and Excise officers from importers and producers at the point at which 
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products enter the wholesale or retail market. Collection requires some form of registration 
or licensing of all alcohol producers or places of alcohol manufacture.
 Tax administration should be effective and efficient. The effectiveness of tax 
administration depends on ensuring high rates of compliance by taxpayers, while the 
efficiency of tax administration requires lowering administrative costs relative to revenue 
collected. Effective and efficient tax administration requires a strong technical capacity 
by the administrative agency and a well-designed tax system. A well-designed excise tax 
policy exhibits transparency and easy definability, thus increasing efficiency by reducing 
administrative costs.
 Effective administration of excise taxation requires a well-established cooperation 
between taxpayers and the tax administration agency. In countries with well-established 
tax collection systems, excise taxes are administered by relying on the taxpayer’s 
registration, filing and payment of tax returns. Tax authorities, in return, execute 
enforcement actions aimed at ensuring compliance by verification. In countries with poor 
administration systems, “enforced compliance” is generally executed by imposing physical 
control over the production and manufacturing process and by applying various kinds of 
tax stamps.
 The government should be aware that substitution consumption among various 
alcoholic beverage categories may occur as a result of taxation and pricing policies. The 
government should also increase tax rates regularly, taking account of inflation and 
population income, in order to make taxation and pricing policies more effective than 
affordable.
 The government should make efforts to prevent tax avoidance and tax evasion in 
order to implement taxation and pricing policies effectively. Tax avoidance is legal; it is a 
change in economic or other activity aimed at reducing tax payment. Tax evasion, on the 
other hand, involves illegal activities aimed at avoiding tax payment.
 The government may tend to modify taxation and pricing policies to protect sales 
of domestic alcohol products. Public health personnel and policy advocates should be 
aware of this situation because, as the tax gap increases, consumers switch to a lower-tax 
product resulting in a less effective taxation policy and difficulty in controlling the problems 
caused by alcohol. Furthermore, when manufacturers, wholesalers or retailers anticipate 
a tax increase, they may stock more alcoholic beverages taxed at the current or lower 
tax level, so that an alcohol taxation increase reduces the effectiveness of taxation policies. 
As a result, the government should consider keeping news of alcohol taxation increases 
quiet.
 To be significantly effective in designing and implementing taxation and pricing 
policies, the government needs several types of information – including market shares of 
alcoholic beverage categories, of on-premise and off-premise alcohol sales, and of 
recorded and unrecorded alcohol consumption, as well as substitution within and between 
XIII
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these alcoholic beverage categories and own-price and cross-price elasticity of various 
types of alcohol. This information is not usually available although, with this information, 
the government can better employ taxation and pricing policies.
 Unrecorded consumption is all alcohol consumption that is not recorded in the 
country where it is consumed. This includes home production, cross-border shopping, 
surrogate alcohol, illegal homemade and artisanal production, and illegal production and 
smuggling on a commercial (industrial) scale. While the effect of cross-border shopping 
on alcohol consumption and alcohol-attributable harm certainly exists, its overall impact 
on global public health is not as large as depicted. As unrecorded consumption constitutes 
a sizeable portion of overall alcohol use, it should be reduced or better controlled as part 
of a national alcohol policy by integrating different measures, including taxation. More 
control of unrecorded alcohol may result in increasingly effective taxation measures. The 
following measures can be used to reduce unrecorded consumption: the prohibition of 
toxic compounds used to denature alcohol (e.g. methanol) can improve health outcomes 
associated with surrogate alcohol consumption; actions limiting illegal trade and counter-
feiting can include the introduction of tax stamps and electronic surveillance of the alcohol 
trade; an overall increase in enforcement; and the offer of financial incentives to home 
and small-scale producers for registration and quality control.
 While there is no doubt that trade agreements have an impact on the freedom to 
implement alcohol policies, this should not lead policy-makers to deny the consideration 
of policies that are entirely legitimate under the current trading system. Policy-makers, 
in general, are free to adopt policies on alcohol provided they are not more trade restrictive 
than necessary to protect health and are non-discriminatory.  While alcohol pricing policies 
may lead to some adjustment costs in the short term, in the long term most economists 
would expect the effect on employment to be effectively zero. In general, trade policies 
are likely to increase alcohol-related harms through their effect on policies that are fully 
or partly protectionist. However, countries  may regulate purely on health grounds. 
Uncertainty over trade treaties – and the exaggerated claims made by companies – could 
hamper domestic policy-making initiatives, and may cause leading policy-makers to avoid 
considering policies that are entirely legitimate under the current trading system. To avoid 
this, it is necessary to send a clear message to policy-makers that, in general, they are 
free to adopt nearly any health policy on alcohol so long as it is  non-discriminatory and 
not more trade restrictive than necessary.
 If people spend less money on alcohol, they will spend more money on other goods, 
which will create jobs elsewhere in the economy. The costs that therefore should be 
considered are the adjustment costs in the medium and short term (i.e. over a few years). 
Alcohol causes economic costs in society, including in health care, policing (plus courts 
and prisons), crime prevention, property damage, traffic accident damage, workplace 
productivity, unemployment and premature mortality. It may also be related to part of the 
considerable cost of HIV/AIDS in some countries. Alcohol policies are likely to decrease 
costs in these areas. These reductions in cost are estimated to far outweigh any potential 
economic disadvantages of alcohol pricing policies.
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 Determining a proportion of excise tax from alcohol products (and other products 
such as tobacco) is a good strategy to secure a reliable and sustainable source of funding 
to support health promotion activities and to control problems caused by harmful alcohol 
consumption. Determining the special budget can result from non-legislation budgeting 
by the government (called “dedicated tax”) or from a legislative process of the parliament 
(called “earmarked tax”). Sources of this budget can also be an existing excise tax 
(earmarked) or may be an additional source on top of the existing excise tax (“surcharged 
tax”). An increasing number of countries have adopted this effective financial mechanism 
following its establishment in Australia in 1983, and scholarly literature shows the 
effectiveness of implementing financial mechanisms of this kind. Governments may 
consider this financial strategy if they need a sustainable funding mechanism to control 
problems caused by alcohol consumption.
 The goal of this resource tool is to help public health personnel and non-economist 
alcohol control policy advocates to effectively discuss, argue and negotiate with finance 
personnel to ensure the inclusion of public health perspectives in taxation and pricing 
policy, design and implementation.
 Determining a proportion of excise tax from alcohol products (and other products 
such as tobacco) is a good strategy to secure a reliable and sustainable source of funding 
to support health promotion activities and to control problems caused by harmful alcohol 
consumption. Determining the special budget can result from non-legislation budgeting 
by the government (called “dedicated tax”) or from a legislative process of the parliament 
(called “earmarked tax”). Sources of this budget can also be an existing excise tax 
(earmarked) or may be an additional source on top of the existing excise tax (“surcharged 
tax”). An increasing number of countries have adopted this effective financial mechanism 
following its establishment in Australia in 1983, and scholarly literature shows the 
effectiveness of implementing financial mechanisms of this kind. Governments may 
consider this financial strategy if they need a sustainable funding mechanism to control 
problems caused by alcohol consumption.
 The goal of this resource tool is to help public health personnel and non-economist 
alcohol control policy advocates to effectively discuss, argue and negotiate with finance 
personnel to ensure the inclusion of public health perspectives in taxation and pricing 
policy, design and implementation.
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 The World Health Organization’ s (WHO) “Global strategy to reduce the harmful 
use of alcohol”, endorsed by the Sixty-third World Health Assembly in May 2010, lists 
alcohol taxation and pricing policies as among the most effective interventions to reduce 
the harmful use of alcohol (WHO, 2010a). To support Member States in their implementation 
of alcohol taxation and pricing policies, the WHO and the ThaiHealth Promotion Foundation 
(Thailand) agreed to develop the WHO Resource Tool on Alcohol Taxation and Pricing 
Policies. This tool provides evidence of the effectiveness of interventions and offers 
guidelines for intervention implementation. The resource tool was created by a memorandum 
of understanding between the WHO and the ThaiHealth Promotion Foundation, and is 
based on the framework of WHO international research initiatives on alcohol, health and 
development. This project was developed by the Center for Alcohol Studies (CAS), Thailand, 
and the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), Canada.
 Literature has collectively illustrated the effectiveness of taxation and pricing 
policies in controlling the public health problems caused by alcohol (Babor et al., 2010; 
Elder et al., 2010; Gallet, 2007; Anderson et al., 2009; Wagenaar et al., 2009b; Wagenaar 
et al., 2010). This knowledge has led public health personnel and non-economist alcohol 
control policy representatives to advocate increasingly for alcohol taxation and pricing 
policies. However, designing and implementing alcohol taxation and pricing policies typically 
falls under the purview of financial officers concerned with public finance rather than with 
public health (Cnossen, 2005; New Zealand Law Commission, 2010). Financial officers 
typically cite five concerns with respect to taxation and pricing policy issues, namely that: 
1) it is unclear why the government should control problems caused by alcohol consumption 
using taxation and pricing policies, 2) that tax revenue generation should not decrease 
because of alcohol taxation and pricing policies, 3) policies other than taxation and pricing 
would be preferable, 4) taxes should be levied on harmful alcohol users rather than on 
social drinkers (Cnossen, 2005; New Zealand Law Commission, 2010), and 5) there are 
difficulties in handling issues such as taxation and pricing policy design and implementation, 
and the problem of unrecorded alcohol consumption.
 The aim of this resource tool is not to convince financial officers to apply taxation 
and pricing policies to control alcohol consumption and its related harms. Rather, the aim 
is to inform public health personnel and non-economist alcohol control policy advocates 
how to facilitate effective discussions and negotiations with financial officers. The goal 
is to integrate public health perspectives into taxation and pricing policy design and 
implementation. Thus, this resource tool explains relevant economic concepts and provides 
evidence of the effectiveness of policies to augment public health personnel and 
non-economist alcohol policy advocates’ understanding of taxation and pricing policies.
 
 
Introduction
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This resource tool is composed of four sections, as follows:
The need for alcohol taxation and pricing policies. Section 1 provides justification 
for alcohol taxation and pricing policies from public health, economic and other 
perspectives. This section provides evidence of the harms and externalities caused 
by alcohol consumption, the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of taxation and 
pricing policies, an answer to the dilemma of tax revenue generation versus alcohol 
consumption control, and a discussion concerning government taxation of the 
harmful use of alcohol and social drinking. This section concludes by describing 
the limitations of taxation and pricing policies.
Basic knowledge of economic concepts for public health personnel. Section 2 
explains several basic economic concepts – including demand-supply equilibrium, 
price mechanisms of taxation and minimum price, price and tax elasticity, price 
and demand under different market structures, short-run and long-run reactions 
of the alcohol market to changes in taxation and pricing policies, alcohol tax/
custom tax/general tax, basic notions related to the structure of an alcoholic 
beverage, and limitations of the economic model.
Problems with the design of taxation and pricing policies. Section 3 contains two 
chapters. The first explains the basic concepts of taxation methods, tax base, 
minimum price, indicators assessing the quality of taxation methods, and indicators 
assessing the extent of tax rates. The second chapter provides epidemiological 
information on tax methods employed in countries worldwide based on data from 
the WHO’s Global Survey on Alcohol and Health 2010.
Taxation and pricing policy implementation. Section 4 is comprised of four short 
chapters. The first addresses the general implementation of taxation and pricing 
policies, such as tax administration, substitution effect, affordability and tax rate 
determination, symmetry of price elasticity, tax avoidance and tax evasion, pro-
tection of domestic brands, alcohol taxation and the poor, and taxation and 
stockpiling. The second chapter focuses on the effect of unrecorded alcohol 
consumption on taxation. The third chapter discusses specific alcohol taxation 
and pricing policy issues that include trade agreement practices, the economy and 
other alcohol control policies. The fourth chapter in this section discusses 
earmarked taxes.
1.
2.
3.
4.
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Section 1
The need for alcohol taxation
and pricing policies
6R
es
ou
rc
e 
to
ol
 o
n 
al
co
ho
l t
ax
at
io
n 
an
d 
pr
ic
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s
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Luis Miguel Galindo, Jürgen Rehm 
 A broader understanding of the need for alcohol taxation and pricing policies by 
governments, public health personnel, and alcohol control policy advocates can lead to 
improvements in such policies. The design and implementation of appropriate alcohol 
taxation and pricing policies can maximize the potential for reductions in the health and 
social burdens caused by alcohol consumption. This section outlines the justification for 
alcohol taxation and pricing policies from three perspectives: 1) the public health 
perspective, 2) the economic perspective, and 3) other perspectives.
The importance of alcohol taxation and pricing policies from a public health 
perspective
 Governments require alcohol taxation and pricing policies that have been formulated 
after accounting for public health concerns for the following reasons:
Alcohol-related problems are significant and increasing
 Alcohol consumption is linked to more than 200 illnesses defined by the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) as three-digit disease codes (Rehm et al., 2010a).
 In 2013, alcohol was the seventh leading risk factor – after dietary risks, high blood 
pressure, child and maternal malnutrition, tobacco smoking, air pollution and high 
body-mass index – for the global burden of disease, as measured by disability adjusted 
life years (DALYs) lost, a measure of both years lost due to premature mortality and years 
lost to disability (Forouzanfar et al., 2015). In 2013, alcohol consumption was responsible 
for 2.8 million deaths (0.8 million female deaths and 2.0 million male deaths) among a 
total of 54.9 million deaths worldwide, and was responsible for 99.3 million DALYs lost 
(20.9 million female DALYs lost and 78.4 million male DALYs lost) among a total of 2449.8 
million DALYs lost worldwide (Forouzanfar et al., 2015). In the same year, alcohol accounted 
for 5.1% (95% confidence interval [CI]: 3.9-6.0%) of all deaths globally, and accounted for 
4.1% (95% CI: 3.3-4.6%) of the total global DALYs lost (Forouzanfar et al., 2015). The 
burden of alcohol consumption increased from 1990 to 2013. Alcohol was responsible for 
4.2% of all deaths in 1990 and was responsible for 3.0% of all DALYs lost in 1990 
Section 1: 
The need for alcohol taxation
and pricing policies
The burden of alcohol-related problems is substantial and increasing.
The price of alcohol is the main factor influencing alcohol consumption and its related 
harms.
Alcohol taxation and pricing policies are among the most effective and cost-effective 
alcohol control measures.
Alcohol taxation and pricing policies can prevent the initiation of drinking.
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(Forouzanfar et al., 2015). The ranking of alcohol use compared to other risk factors for 
the global burden of disease has remained the same, as alcohol consumption was also 
ranked the seventh leading cause of DALYs lost in 1990 (Forouzanfar et al., 2015). An 
increase in the global burden of disease attributable to alcohol was also observed by Rehm 
and colleagues (Rehm et al., 2009).
The burden of disease is a growing problem for low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs). As gross domestic product adjusted for purchase power parity (GDP-PPP) 
increases, so does alcohol consumption (Shield et al., 2011). Additionally, LMIC populations 
experience a greater amount of harm compared to high-income countries for the same 
amount of alcohol consumed (WHO, 2011).
Alcohol consumption also creates a substantial economic burden (Rehm et al., 
2009). Rehm and colleagues demonstrated that the weighted average economic cost of 
alcohol consumption was 2.5% of GDP-PPP among selected high-income countries (Canada, 
France, Scotland and United States), and also showed that the average social cost of 
alcohol consumption was 2.1% of GDP-PPP for selected middle-income countries (MICs) 
(Republic of Korea and Thailand) (Rehm et al., 2009). Although there is a slightly greater 
economic burden in high-income countries compared to LMICs, the economic burden of 
alcohol consumption will increase for LMICs because per capita alcohol consumption in 
these countries increases as GDP-PPP increases (Shield et al., 2011).
The problems caused by alcohol consumption are significant and are increasing 
worldwide; however, a substantial portion of the alcohol-attributable burden of disease 
is avoidable. Thus, effective policies to reduce alcohol consumption, its related ills, and 
alcohol-attributable costs must urgently be implemented by governments. Moreover, 
LMICs in particular may need to implement unique alcohol control policies to prevent the 
growth of problems caused by increases in alcohol consumption.
Price is an important factor that determines alcohol consumption and its related problems
In most countries, alcohol is a commodity with some restrictions, such as availability 
and a minimum purchasing age. However, it can be bought and consumed freely within 
these restrictions. As is the case with most commodities, price is an important determinant 
of sales and, ultimately, consumption (Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 2005). Section 2 
provides an in-depth discussion of the relationship between price and alcohol consumption. 
The significance of price as a determinant of alcohol consumption follows economic theory 
and has been empirically demonstrated in numerous studies (Babor et al., 2010), including 
experimentally controlled studies (Babor et al., 1980; Babor et al., 1978).
Alcohol taxation and pricing policies are among the most effective and cost-effective 
alcohol control measures
Taxation in part determines the price of alcoholic beverages (Babor et al., 2010). 
Two indicators that are used to describe the effectiveness of taxation and pricing policies 
are price elasticity and tax elasticity. Price elasticity is determined by the percentage 
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change in an outcome of interest that results from a 1% increase in price. For example, a 
price elasticity in the demand for beer of -0.4 means an increase of 10% in the price of 
beer is associated with a 4% reduction in beer consumption; a price elasticity in traffic 
fatalities of -0.2 means a 10% increase in the alcohol price is associated with a 2% reduction 
in traffic fatalities. Similarly, tax elasticity is determined by the percentage change in an 
outcome resulting from a 1% increase in taxation. For example, a tax elasticity of demand 
for beer of -0.2 means an increase of 10% in beer tax is associated with a 2% reduction 
in beer consumption; a tax elasticity of traffic fatalities of -0.1 means a reduction in 
traffic fatalities of 1% results from a 10% increase in alcohol taxation. These two indicators 
are different in terms of their magnitude because tax elasticity typically has less value 
than price elasticity; however, these indicators are combined when analysed in some of 
the literature (Wagenaar et al., 2009b; Wagenaar et al., 2010).
The impact of alcohol taxation and pricing policies on alcohol consumption
 Wagenaar and colleagues (Wagenaar et al., 2009b) and Elder and colleagues (Elder 
et al., 2010) performed systematic reviews of price elasticity and tax elasticity that included 
studies primarily from high-income countries. In their review of 112 studies, Wagenaar 
and colleagues mixed price and tax elasticities in their analyses and indicated that the 
mean of price and tax elasticity of demand is -0.46 for beer, -0.69 for wine, -0.80 for 
spirits, and -0.51 for total alcohol consumption (Wagenaar et al., 2009b). In a systematic 
review of 72 studies, Elder and colleagues observed that the median value of price elasticity 
is -0.50 for beer, -0.64 for wine, -0.79 for spirits, and -0.77 for ethanol (Elder et al., 2010). 
Sornpaisarn and colleagues (Sornpaisarn et al., 2013) performed a systematic review that 
summarized the results of 10 studies conducted in LMICs assessing the effect of taxation 
and pricing policies. The authors estimated that the average price elasticities of demand 
for these countries were -0.5 for beer, -0.79 for other alcohol (including wine and spirits), 
and -0.64 for total alcohol consumption (Sornpaisarn et al., 2013). See Table 1.1 for a 
summary of price elasticities of demand.
a Results are pooled estimates of both price and tax elasticity. 
Table 1.1. The price elasticity of demand by beverage type in high-income countries and 
in LMICs
The price elasticity of demand
   LMICs
Beverage type 
High-income countries
Beer
Wine
Spirits
Total
(Wagenaar et al., 
2009b)a
-0.46
-0.69
-0.80
-0.51
(Elder et al.,
2010)
-0.50
-0.64
-0.79
-0.77
(Sornpaisarn et al., 
2013)
-0.50
-0.64
-0.79
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A meta-analysis of alcohol price and income elasticities with corrections for 
publication bias (by excluding the “outlier studies” with extreme estimates of price elasticity, 
which were included in the previous systematic reviews) by Nelson (2013) estimated 
average price elasticities. However, the results of this analysis should be interpreted 
cautiously because there was only one coder. Based on his systematic review, Nelson found 
smaller but still significant effect sizes of average price elasticities of -0.30 for beer, -0.45 
for wine and -0.55 for spirits (Nelson, 2013).
The impact of alcohol taxation and price on alcohol-related harms
Wagenaar and colleagues summarized the results of 50 studies that quantified the 
effects of alcohol taxation or price on alcohol-related harms. From these studies, Wagenaar 
and colleagues observed that the price and tax elasticities of harms are -0.347 for 
alcohol-related disease and injury outcomes, -0.112 for traffic crash outcomes, -0.055 for 
sexually transmitted diseases, -0.048 for suicide, -0.022 for violence, -0.022 for other 
drug use, and -0.014 for crime and other misbehaviours (Wagenaar et al., 2010). Elder 
and colleagues observed that the tax elasticities of traffic fatalities range from -0.1 to 
-0.27, and the tax elasticity of violence and crimes range from -0.09 to -0.13 (Elder et 
al., 2010). See Table 1.2 for the summary of tax elasticities of alcohol-related harms.
a Results are pooled estimates of both price and tax elasticity. 
b These figures are based on tax elasticity, which is a percentage change in an outcome of interest resulting 
from a 1% increase in alcohol taxation. Typically, in the situation of a taxation increase resulting in a price 
increase and, eventually, in a reduction of the outcome of interest, price elasticity has a higher value than 
tax elasticity.
Table 1.2. The price elasticity of various health outcomes in high-income countries
Price elasticity
Alcohol-related disease and 
injury outcomes
Alcohol-impaired driving
Motor vehicle crashes
Motor vehicle injuries
Death from cirrhosis
Alcohol dependence
Sexually transmitted diseases
Suicide
Violence
Crime and related behaviours
Wagenaar et al., 2009ba
-0.347
-0.112
-0.055
-0.048
-0.022
-0.014
Outcome Elder et al.,2010
-0.50 to -0.81
-1.20
-0.1 to -0.27b
Inverse relationship between price and 
cirrhosis death, but there are substantial 
differences in the estimated strength of 
this relationship
-1.49
-0.13 for rapeb, 
-0.09 for robberyb
-0.12 for any violence towards 
childrenb
-0.09 for robberyb
-0.12 for any violence 
towards childrenb
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The effects of alcohol taxation and price for risky subpopulations
 Increases in alcohol taxation and pricing reduce alcohol consumption in general, 
and excessive alcohol consumption among young persons and among people in the general 
population (Wagenaar et al., 2009b; Babor et al., 2010; Elder et al., 2010). Using the results 
from 10 studies, Wagenaar and colleagues observed that the mean elasticity of demand 
for heavy drinkers is -0.28 (Wagenaar et al., 2009b). In their systematic review, Elder and 
colleagues found that the price elasticity of demand is -0.29 for high school students, 
-0.53 for heavy drinkers among people aged 16-21 years, and -0.95 and -3.54 for 
binge-drinking 18-21 year-old males and females respectively (Elder et al., 2010). Elder 
and colleagues also observed that the price elasticity of demand is -0.29 to -1.29 for adult 
binge drinkers (Elder et al., 2010). A recent qualitative systematic review on the effects 
of alcohol prices on binge drinking claimed that increased alcohol taxes or prices were 
unlikely to be effective in reducing binge drinking, regardless of gender or age group 
(Nelson, 2015). However, the results of this study should be interpreted cautiously because 
of its methodology for vote counting. Vote counting is a simple but limited method for 
synthesizing evidence from multiple evaluative studies, and involves simply comparing the 
number of significant positive studies with the number of significant negative studies and 
the number of non-significant studies. Vote counting does not take account of the quality 
of the studies, the size of the samples, or the size of the effect.
Cost-effectiveness of alcohol taxation and pricing policies
 Alcohol taxation and pricing policies are effective alcohol control measures and are 
highly cost-effective compared to other alcohol control interventions (Chisholm et al., 
2006; Anderson et al., 2009). Anderson and colleagues reviewed published systematic 
reviews and meta-analyses that assessed the effectiveness of policies and programmes 
aimed at reducing the avoidable harm caused by alcohol (Anderson et al., 2009). In terms 
of the cost in international dollars of one DALY saved, Anderson and colleagues observed 
that, in the WHO regions of the Americas and Europe, one DALY costs 241-380 international 
dollars when increasing taxation, 515-567 international dollars for measures that regulate 
the availability of alcohol, 781-924 international dollars for drink-driving policies and 
countermeasures, and 931-961 international dollars for measures regulating the marketing 
of alcoholic beverages (Anderson et al., 2009). For comparison purposes, the WHO defines 
a cost-effective intervention as one that averts each additional DALY at a cost less than 
the GDP per capita (WHO, 2002). However, for countries with high levels of unrecorded 
alcohol consumption, the cost-effectiveness of pricing and alcohol control policies was 
lower (e.g. 1150-1358 international dollars for the WHO Western Pacific region) (Anderson 
et al., 2009). In countries where unrecorded alcohol constitutes a large proportion of the 
total alcohol consumed, increasing the proportion of alcohol that is taxed may be more 
effective than increasing the tax on already taxed beverages (Anderson et al., 2009).
11
Resource tool on 
alcohol taxation and pricing policies
Differences in the effects of alcohol taxation and pricing policies depending on the 
drinking culture
 The effects of alcohol taxation and pricing policies may differ depending on the 
drinking culture. Fogarty and colleagues’ study found no differences in the effects of 
alcohol taxation and pricing policies between countries; however, Fogarty found that 
alcohol elasticity is negatively associated with market share, and that alcoholic beverages 
with a large market share tend to have more inelastic demand compared to alcoholic 
beverages with a small market share (Fogarty, 2006). This implies that the dominant 
alcoholic beverage in a market is considered a basic dietary commodity and is thus less 
responsive to changes in price when compared to other beverages. Additionally, a country’s 
beverage preferences can change over time – e.g. in Sweden, spirits were popular (inelastic) 
during the first half of the 20th century, but then spirits and beer became popular from 
1968 to 1986 and, finally, wine gained popularity during the period from 1984 to 2004 
(Babor et al., 2010). The results of previous studies suggest that price elasticity decreases 
over time in some countries (Babor et al., 2010). A study of trends in alcohol and tobacco 
consumption in the United Kingdom from 1963 to 2003 found that alcohol price elasticity 
moved towards zero: short-run price elasticity changed from -0.76 (in 1986) to -0.42 (in 
2003), and the long-run price elasticity changed from -0.52 to 0.10 (the value 0.10 is not 
statistically significantly different from zero) (Mazzocchi, 2006). Mazzocchi (2006) also 
found that an increase in alcohol consumption in the United Kingdom from 1963 to 2003 
was explained by a strong alcohol preference (compared to tobacco preference), addictive 
behaviour and a change in price elasticity. By studying price elasticity in Finland from 1955 
to 1980, Ahtola and colleagues found that price elasticity changed from -0.93 in 1955-
1956 to -0.70 during the period 1979-1980 (Ahtola et al., 1986). It has also been observed 
that alcohol is more inelastic in countries with a higher adult per capita consumption of 
alcohol (Holder & Edwards, 1995; Fogarty, 2006). Results from these studies imply that 
the drinking culture or norm of a country, in terms of preferred beverage (and the market 
share of this beverage) and the amount of alcohol consumed, influences the effects of 
alcohol taxation and pricing.
Addiction attributes of alcohol and price elasticity
 Traditionally, the elasticities computed by economists are short-run elasticities. 
They are considered myopic in the sense that they assume that alcohol consumption in 
previous years does not affect current consumption. However, alcohol consumption can 
be addictive (Chaloupkaet al., 2002). The seminal work by Becker & Murphy (1988), 
however, assumed that human beings are not myopic, even in the case of substance abuse. 
This implies that alcohol consumers do not ignore the future consequences of their 
consumption decisions. Increased current alcohol consumption, as an addictive substance, 
follows from increased past consumption. Becker & Murphy (1988) assumed that a 
consumer’s current consumption decision depends on the changes in expected future 
costs of alcohol consumption. Because the future costs could increase because of tax or 
price policies, for instance, it is likely that future consumption will decrease. The authors 
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predict that such anticipated impact (decrease) on future consumption will cause a parallel 
reduction in current consumption.
Becker & Murphy (1988) further predicted that short-run elasticity, based on the 
myopic view, will be smaller in absolute terms than long-run elasticity that allows for 
variations in past consumption. This prediction has been confirmed in several studies, 
mainly from developed countries (e.g. Johnson et al., 1992; Becker et al., 1994; Grossman 
et al., 1998; Bentzen et al., 1999; Baltagi & Griffin, 2002). The dearth of data in developing 
countries has limited the application of this model. Grossman et al. (1998), for instance, 
using data from the United States, showed that alcohol consumption is addictive. They 
reported that the long-run price elasticity is approximately 60% larger than the short-run 
elasticity.
These results, applying the rational addiction model of Becker & Murphy (1988), 
show that long-run elasticities are higher than their short-run counterparts. This is 
confirmed in Gallet’s (2007) review, where the average long-run elasticity of alcohol 
reported is -0.82 compared to the short-run value which is estimated at -0.52. This 
finding, according to Grossman et al. (1998), indicates the significance of considering 
long-run elasticity when addressing pricing policies, including tax, as a means of curbing 
harmful drinking and alcohol-related harm. This is because higher alcohol taxes in the 
current year will lead to a reduction in alcohol consumption in current and future years. 
This effect will reduce future revenue from alcohol tax.
Alcohol taxation and pricing policies can prevent drinking initiation
Alcohol taxation and pricing measures can be applied to achieve long-term 
prevention of alcohol-related harm (Sornpaisarn et al., 2012a; Sornpaisarn et al., 2015b). 
Fig. 1.1 illustrates the short- and long-term prevention of alcohol-related harms from 
alcohol control policies. Policies that reduce consumption are short-term prevention 
policies, whereas policies that prevent drinking initiation are long-term prevention policies 
(Sornpaisarn et al., 2012a). The first study that examined the ability of alcohol taxation 
to prevent drinking initiation was performed by Sornpaisarn and colleagues (2015b). This 
study found that a 10% increase in the inflation-adjusted tax rate of the total alcohol 
market from 2001 to 2011 was associated with a 4.3% reduction in the prevalence of 
lifetime drinking (as a surrogate of drinking initiation prevention) among Thai people 
between 15 and 24 years of age.
13
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Preventing drinking initiation is particularly important in LMICs where there are 
high rates of lifetime abstainers (WHO, 2014). Furthermore, adolescent drinking is prone 
to be problematic in LMICs (Sornpaisarn et al., 2012a). In 2010, for countries in the WHO 
regions of the Eastern Mediterranean, South-East Asia, and Africa, the prevalence of 
lifetime abstainers (among people 15 years of age and older) was 90%, 77%, and 57%, 
respectively, whereas the prevalence of lifetime abstainers in 2010 in high-income countries 
was 21%, 19% and 37% for the European, American and Western Pacific WHO regions, 
respectively (WHO, 2014). As observed by Shield et al. (2011) and Sornpaisarn et al. (2012a), 
as the GDP-PPP per capita increases in LMICs, so does alcohol consumption (Shield et 
al., 2011) and the prevalence of current drinkers (Sornpaisarn et al., 2012a). This factor 
may lead to increases in the magnitude of alcohol-related harms (Rehm et al., 2004) and 
a higher risk of mortality and morbidity from alcohol-related causes (such as injuries) 
(Smith & Barss, 1991). Thus, alcohol control policies, particularly in LMICs, should aim 
simultaneously to reduce consumption by existing drinkers and prevent the initiation of 
drinking.
The importance of alcohol taxation and pricing policy from an economic 
perspective
Alcohol taxation and pricing policies are also important from an economic 
perspective. Cnossen (2010) outlined that the objectives of excise taxation include: 1) 
raising revenues, 2) externality correction, and 3) information failure and internality 
correction.
Source: reproduced from Sornpaisarn et al., 2012a.
Prevent drinking 
initiation among 
young people 
15–25 years of 
age
Reduce drinking 
among drinkers
Prevent regular 
drinkers among 
adults
Prevent alcohol-
attributable 
harms
Prevent alcohol-
attributable harms 
among adults
LONG-TERM PREVENTION OF HARMS (25 YEARS)
SHORT-TERM PREVENTION OF HARMS
Fig. 1.1. Diagram of the short- and long-term preventions of alcohol-attributable harm 
addressed by alcohol control policies
Alcohol control 
policies
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Revenue-raising efficiency aspects
Governments employ alcohol excise taxation (as with excise tax on other goods 
such as tobacco, petroleum and motor vehicles) for revenue-generation purposes (Cnossen, 
2010). Excise tax is typically easier to administer than other forms of taxation. Alcoholic 
beverages are easily identifiable products with a high sales volume, few producers and 
few substitutes. Consequently, the consumption of alcohol is consistently high despite 
excise-induced price increases (Cnossen, 2010). While alcoholic beverages may be taxed 
to account for externalities, tax may also be imposed on alcoholic beverages because 
there is a level of complementarity between the demand for leisure and the consumption 
of alcohol1  (Corlett & Hague, 1953; Grossman et al., 1993; Kaplow, 2010). This is more so 
the case for heavy drinkers than for light or moderate drinkers where alcohol consumption 
may be complementary to work (Crawford et al., 2010). Such taxes are justified on the 
basis of the disincentive effects created by income taxation on labour supply (Corlett & 
Hague, 1953; Grossman et al., 1993; Cook & Moore, 1994) by effectively reducing income 
taxation and increasing the demand for leisure (Cook & Moore, 1994). Because leisure 
cannot be taxed directly, commodities such as alcoholic beverages that are consumed as 
a component of leisure, can be taxed at a relatively high rate to discourage reductions in 
labour supply (Corlett & Hague, 1953) that result from alcohol consumption.
The Ramsey rule (a rule proposed by economist Frank P. Ramsey) suggests that, 
for the purposes of taxation revenue, governments can impose higher-than-average tax 
rates on goods and services that are price inelastic (Cnossen, 2010). Price inelastic alcoholic 
beverages have generated excise tax revenue for governments for more than a century 
(Babor et al., 2010).
Tax revenue generation from alcoholic beverages is an important source of state 
revenue for some countries (Babor et al., 2010). In the United States between 1911 and 
1917, over one third of total tax revenues were generated from alcoholic beverages, and 
similar figures have been observed for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Babor et al., 2010). The significance of excise 
taxes generated from alcoholic beverages as a source of government revenue declined in 
most high-income countries during the 20th century, particularly after revenue increased 
from company taxes, from the introduction of personal income taxes and from indirect 
taxes such as “value added taxes or general sales taxes” (Babor et al., 2010). Ireland has 
experienced a decrease in alcohol tax revenues relative to total state revenues since 1970 
(alcohol taxation in Ireland accounted for 14.4% of all tax revenues in 1969-1971 (Cnossen, 
2010) and 5% of all tax revenues in 1996 (Babor et al., 2010). In 1991, for the 12 European 
Union countries, alcohol taxation accounted for 2.4% of tax revenues (Mäkelä & Österberg, 
2009). In developing countries, the proportion of government revenues generated from 
alcohol excise taxes was 2% in Nigeria, 2.3% in South Africa, 4% in Sri Lanka and 10% in 
Kenya (Babor et al., 2010).
1  Such complementarity implies that, for a given level of total spending, individuals who supply more labour 
will drink less (Crawford et al., 2010).
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Externality-correcting issues
 Excise taxation is typically rationalized as an intervention that governments employ 
to correct for externalities (external costs of a particular good that consumers or producers 
impose on other people). The charging of consumers and/or producers for external costs, 
which should reduce the consumption of a particular good to socially acceptable levels, 
is known as the Pigouvian prescription (Cnossen, 2010). For the Pigouvian prescription 
to be effective, Cnossen states that the imposed excise taxation for alcohol should be 
organized so that the reduction in the external cost of heavy and moderate drinkers is 
greater than any welfare (well-being) loss experienced by light drinkers who never binge 
(Cnossen, 2010). However, as alcohol consumption at the population level follows a particular 
distribution (Rehm et al., 2010b; Kehoe et al., 2012) and all countries experience a net 
negative effect from alcohol consumption (Lim et al., 2012), all countries may benefit from 
increases in alcohol taxation.
 Other factors support government taxation of all alcohol consumed. First, there 
is no effective information on how to tax the harmful use of alcohol only (New Zealand 
Law Commission, 2010; Ataguba, 2012). It is difficult to identify and measure the marginal 
costs of the harmful use of alcohol (Smith, 2005). Second, the preventive paradox implies 
that taxation measures should be employed either to prevent chronic problems caused 
by heavy drinkers or to prevent acute problems caused by binge drinkers (New Zealand 
Law Commission, 2010). Eaton argues that governments should be concerned not only 
with heavy drinkers, who represent the minority of the drinking population. Binge drinkers 
should also be of concern and are among the social drinkers that represent the majority 
of the drinking population (New Zealand Law Commission, 2010). Third, the taxing of all 
alcohol consumed prevents current heavy drinking and prevents future heavy drinkers by 
reducing consumption among young people (New Zealand Law Commission, 2010). Finally, 
taxing all alcohol consumed in the market is equitable: heavy drinkers still pay a greater 
amount of excise tax than do social drinkers (New Zealand Law Commission, 2010). For 
example, based on excise taxes in New Zealand for 2007-2008, light and moderate drinkers 
(50% of New Zealand drinkers) paid only NZ$ 38 per person in excise taxes per year, 
whereas the top 10% of heavy drinkers paid over NZ$ 1300 per person per year 
(New Zealand Law Commission, 2010).
 Fig. 1.2 shows that consumption of an externality-producing good is lower if the 
perceived marginal cost (MC) (the cost of producing one more unit of a particular good) 
and the marginal externality (ME) are taken into account. Every unit of an 
externality-producing good consumed or produced causes ME. When only the perceived 
MC is considered by consumers, competitive producers will produce an output of Q
0
 units; 
however, a producer’s output will be Q
1
 when the true social MC (including the ME) is 
taken into account (Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 2005).
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Information failure and internality-correcting arguments
 
 With respect to alcohol, consumers do not take negative externalities into account 
and do not possess full information and/or recognize the negative long-term consequences 
(Cnossen, 2010; Kahneman, 2003; Gruber & Koszegi, 2001). Kahneman proposed that 
humans have bounded rationality and decide to perform a particular behaviour based on 
the immediate situation rather than on a perfect rationale (Kahneman, 2003).
If the younger generation does not fully recognize the negative health consequences of 
alcohol consumption (information failure) that will occur in the future (internalities), 
governments could apply excise taxation to raise alcohol prices to reduce consumption 
(Cnossen, 2010). Gruber & Koszegi (2001), in an analysis of the benefits of taxation of 
tobacco, argued that governments should consider the “externalities” when formulating 
taxation policies, but should also consider the “internalities” (Gruber & Koszegi, 2001).
The significance of alcohol taxation and pricing policies from other perspectives
 In addition to alcohol-related health and economic burdens, alcohol consumption 
is associated with a social burden (Klingemann, 2001). Alcohol has been considered a 
major cause of deviant behaviours ranging from disorderly and socially disruptive conduct 
to serious threats to public order and safety (Klingemann, 2001). Two recent literature 
reviews have found sufficient evidence to demonstrate a causal relationship between 
alcohol consumption and violence (Room & Rossow, 2001) and found a strong association 
between the amount of alcohol consumed and the prevalence of violence against an 
Source: reproduced by permission of the publisher from Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 
2005.
Fig. 1.2. Efficient consumption or production when taking into account the externality 
caused by a particular product
P$/unit of (Q)
Social
Marginal Cost
Marginal externality
Perceived
Marginal Cost
MC+ME
P
Q
1
Q
0
Q (Quantity)
MC
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intimate partner (Foran & O’Leary, 2008). Although information is limited concerning the 
extent of child abuse, divorce and marital problems, and work-related problems other 
than work accidents caused by and associated with alcohol consumption, the magnitude 
of these harms is estimated to be substantial (Babor et al., 2010). National surveys 
estimated that 70% of Australians and 71% of New Zealanders were affected by the 
drinking habits of strangers (they experienced nuisance, fear or abuse). Additionally, 30% 
of Australians and 25% of New Zealanders reported that the drinking habits of someone 
close to them negatively affected them (Casswell et al., 2011; Laslett et al., 2011). In New 
Zealand, 84% of people knew at least one heavy drinker and experienced harm from this 
person’s drinking (Casswell et al., 2011). Because these social harms are associated with 
alcohol consumption, a decrease in consumption that results from an increase in taxation 
and/or price should reduce traffic fatalities and injuries, crime and violence. Thus, alcohol 
taxation and pricing policies can be justified as a means of maintaining social order.
Many religions (such as Buddhism and Islam) prohibit alcohol consumption or consider it 
sinful, whereas other religions use alcohol ceremonially. Previous research has found a 
strong association between people’s religious tendencies and the amount of alcohol they 
consume. The more religious person, on average, consumes less alcohol (Fearer, 2004). 
Thus, for religious countries and territories (particularly in the case of predominantly 
Buddhist or Muslim countries), alcohol control policies, including taxation and pricing 
measures, can be advocated from a religious perspective (Sornpaisarn & Kaewmnungkun, 
2012c).
Limitations of alcohol taxation and pricing policies
 Major arguments regarding limitations of alcohol taxation and pricing policies 
relate to whether these policies could reduce consumers’ consumption or just make 
consumers shift their drinking from expensive alcoholic beverages to cheaper ones, and 
whether such policies could selectively affect problem drinkers rather than social drinkers 
(IARD, 2016). The first limitation is a problem of substitution which could reduce the 
impact of the policies. Substitution means that consumers may choose to shift their 
drinking from the more expensive alcoholic beverages to the cheaper ones instead of 
stopping or reducing their drinking. Substitution can occur in any of the following ways: 
shifting within a beverage type (from an expensive brand to a cheap one), from one 
beverage type to another which is cheaper, from taxed to untaxed (or unrecorded) alcoholic 
beverages, from expensive on-premise beverages to cheap off-premise beverages, or 
purchasing alcoholic beverages in bulk at discount rates to offset increases in price (IARD, 
2016). Governments should consider the possible substitution effect when implementing 
taxation and pricing policies, particularly in cases where the differential tax rate policy is 
employed.
 Unrecorded alcohol consumption has been shown to reduce the effectiveness of 
alcohol taxation and pricing strategies (Anderson et al., 2009; IARD, 2016). Unrecorded 
alcoholic beverages include privately imported alcohol, privately produced alcohol, alcohol 
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intended for industrial, technical, or medical use, alcohol sold duty-free to foreign embassies, 
consumption of alcohol abroad, consumption of beverages that contain alcohol but which 
are not defined as alcoholic beverages in official statistics, and an over- or under-estimation 
of statistics on recorded consumption. The consumption of alcohol by individuals abroad, 
the consumption of beverages that contain alcohol but are not defined as alcoholic 
beverages in official statistics, and the over- and under-estimation of recorded consumption 
statistics create their own economic dynamics in the domestic alcohol system and, 
consequently, are generally not included in discussions concerning unrecorded alcohol 
control policies (Nordlund & Österberg, 2000). As alcohol taxation increases, the amount 
of unrecorded alcohol consumption tends to increase, thereby reducing the effectiveness 
of alcohol taxation and pricing strategies (Anderson et al., 2009). Thus, when implementing 
strategies, governments should also consider policies that aim to reduce the unrecorded 
consumption of alcohol.
 Effective alcohol policies other than taxation and pricing should also be implemented 
to reduce alcohol consumption and its resulting harms (Babor et al., 2010; WHO, 2010a). 
Babor and colleagues’ (2010) systematic review assessed and compared various alcohol 
control policies and measures with respect to their effectiveness, breadth of research 
support and cross-national testing. Based on Babor and colleagues’ assessment of 42 
policy options, 19 options – including reducing affordability, restrictions on marketing, 
availability, and accessibility, and drink-driving deterrence measures – were deemed 
effective (Babor et al., 2010). Of these strategies, taxation, availability controls and 
advertising controls were identified as the three “best buys” (the most cost-effective 
alcohol control policies) by the first Global Ministerial Conference on Healthy Lifestyles 
and Non-communicable Disease Control and the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly 
on the Prevention and Control of Non-communicable Diseases in New York in September 
2011 (WHO, 2012).
Summary of Section 1
 Alcohol taxation and pricing policies have public health, economic and social benefits. 
Such policies: 1) generate tax revenue, 2) reduce alcohol consumption and its related 
harms (which cover both externalities and internalities) among various groups, including 
young people and heavy drinkers, and 3) prevent drinking initiation, which is a significant 
preventive strategy among LMICs that report a high prevalence of lifetime abstainers. 
Although controversy surrounds whether taxation should be imposed on social drinking 
or on harmful use only, several factors support government taxation on general alcoholic 
beverages in order to mitigate harmful alcohol use. However, to design or promote 
appropriate alcohol excise taxation methods, government personnel and/or alcohol taxation 
and pricing policy advocates must understand the basic economic concepts that influence 
these policies.
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Economic concepts for
public health personnel
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Bundit Sornpaisarn, Esa Österberg, Kevin D. Shield, Jürgen Rehm
 To advocate pricing and taxation policies effectively from a financial perspective, 
public health professionals and non-economist alcohol policy advocates require knowledge 
of several economic concepts. These concepts include:
Demand-supply equilibrium
 Demand-supply equilibrium is a fundamental economic concept that explains alcohol 
excise taxation (Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 2005). Fig. 2.1 illustrates the equilibrium 
of demand and supply in a competitive market. Demand refers to the amount of a product 
that consumers will buy at a specified price and during a specified period. Supply refers 
to how much of a product producers will sell at a specified price and during a specified 
period. A competitive market contains a number of buyers and sellers; no party buys or 
sells a substantial quantity of product. Consequently, the market price of a product in a 
competitive market cannot be manipulated (Malcolm, 2011). The demand curve (D-D) and 
the supply curve (S-S) in Fig. 2.1 demonstrate the collective economic behaviours of 
consumers and producers, respectively. The demand curve shows that consumers are 
collectively willing to buy a greater quantity of a particular good if the price per unit of 
that good decreases. The supply curve shows that producers are collectively willing to 
sell a greater quantity of a particular good if the price per unit of that good increases. At 
the equilibrium point E in the competitive market, the quantity that consumers want to 
buy equals the quantity that producers want to sell. 
Section 2: 
Economic concepts for
public health personnel
demand-supply equilibrium;
price mechanisms of taxation and minimum price;
price and tax elasticity;
price and demand under different market structures;
short-run and long-run reactions of the alcohol market to changes in taxation and pricing 
policies;
alcohol excise tax, custom tax and general tax;
basic notions related to the structure of an alcoholic beverage; and
limitations of the economic model.
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 If the price of a good is less than its price under equilibrium (P
0
), consumers demand 
more of the good, but producers want to sell less than they would at equilibrium (Q
0
). 
Conversely, if the price of a good is greater than P
0
, producers want to sell more, but 
consumers demand less than Q
0
. Thus, the quantity Q
0
 at equilibrium point E is optimal 
for the market as a whole, and is equal to consumer surplus plus producer surplus. Consumer 
surplus is represented by the area under the demand curve and above the line EP
0
, whereas 
producer surplus is represented by the area above the supply curve and under the line 
EP
0
. Consumer surplus is welfare gained by consumers because they can buy the good at 
price P
0
, which is less than the price they are willing to pay at lower quantities of sales. 
Producer surplus is welfare gained by the producers because they can sell the good at 
quantity Q
0
, which is greater than the quantity they are willing to sell at a lower price.
Price mechanisms of taxation and minimum price
 Tax refers to required monetary payments by households and businesses to 
governments (Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 2005). Fig. 2.2 illustrates the mechanism 
by which taxation decreases consumption and creates a welfare loss by influencing price 
(Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 2005). If a government imposes taxation equal to the 
line A-B, the quantity (Q) will shift from the equilibrium Q
0
 to the new equilibrium Q
t
. At 
Q
t
, the price that producers receive is represented by P
p
 (producer price), whereas the 
price that consumers pay is represented by P
c
 (consumer price). The rectangle A-B-X-Y 
is tax revenue that the government collects (equal to the tax rate multiplied by the 
equilibrium quantity). The triangle A-B-E is a net welfare loss: the total loss of consumer 
surplus and producer surplus (A-E-B-X-Y) minus tax revenue (A-B-X-Y). 
Source: reproduced by permission of the publisher from Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 
2005.
P$/unit of (Q)
Producer
surplus
Consumer
surplus
P
0
Q
0
Q (Quantity)
S
SD
D
E
Fig. 2.1. Demand-supply equilibrium.
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 In the situation above the government receives the full amount of the excise taxes. 
Consumers pay a higher price for the product (which results in a reduction in consumption), 
and producers receive a lower net-of-tax price for their product. In this case (and in all 
instances where the supply curve is upward-sloping), the excise tax is borne by both 
consumers and producers.  However, alcohol producers may be able to adjust their product 
quality and quantity to reduce the tax burden in the long run under certain market 
structures, which is explained in more detail below under “Price and demand under different 
market structures” and “Short- and long-term reactions of the alcohol market to changes 
in taxation and pricing policies.” 
 Minimum price is an alcohol control measure imposed by the government to prohibit 
the sale of a particular product below a designated price (Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 
2005). Fig. 2.3 illustrates a decrease in consumption from an imposed minimum price and 
the subsequent welfare loss. If the government imposes a minimum price equal to P
mp 
(the line X-Z), the quantity utilized shifts from the equilibrium Q
0
 to the new equilibrium 
Q
mp
. At price P
mp
, consumers want to buy only Q
mp
. Although producers want to sell more, 
the quantity B-C becomes excess to demand. The rectangle A-B-X-Y represents profit to 
the producers (equal to the extra price [A-B] multiplied by quantity). If a government has 
a monopoly on the sale of a good, all or part of this extra profit is claimed by the 
government; however, in an open market, this extra profit is claimed by the private alcohol 
producers. The triangle A-B-E represents the net welfare loss: the total loss of consumer 
surplus and producer surplus (A-E-B-X-Y) minus extra profits (A-B-X-Y). 
Source: reproduced by permission of the publisher from Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 
2005.
P$/unit of (Q)
Net welfare loss
Tax revenue
P
O
P
C
P
P
Q
0
Q
t
Q (Quantity)
S
X
Y A
SD
D
E
B
Fig. 2.2. The relationship between taxation, price and the equilibrium.
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 Minimum price is a measure that directly manipulates the retail prices of alcoholic 
beverages, whereas taxation indirectly manipulates price. However, both minimum price 
and taxation can reduce alcohol consumption. Minimum price is not a fiscal measure but 
a regulation measure; hence, intensive policy enforcement is required.
Price and tax elasticity
 Price and tax elasticities are used as indicators of the effects of pricing and taxation 
on alcohol consumption or harms (Babor et al., 2010). Below we outline some of the 
elasticities applied in alcohol research. The price elasticity of demand (PE) is defined as 
the percentage change in demand of a good that results from a 1% increase in price. For 
example, if the price elasticity of demand for alcohol is estimated to be -0.4, a 10% increase 
in alcohol price results in an overall alcohol consumption decrease of 4%. Tax elasticity of 
demand is defined as the percentage change in consumption because of a 1% increase in 
taxation. 
Source: reproduced by permission of the publisher from Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 
2005.
P$/unit of (Q)
Net welfare loss
Extra profit
P
O
P
C
P
P
Q
0
Q
t
Q (Quantity)
S
X
Y A
SD
D
E
B Z
C
Fig. 2.3. The relationship between minimum pricing and the utility equilibrium.
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 Additionally, the price elasticity and tax elasticity of alcohol-related harms, such 
as traffic fatalities, are defined as the percentage change in harms that results from a 
1% increase in the price or tax of alcohol respectively.
 Cross-price elasticity of demand (CPEoD) refers to the percentage change in 
demand for one good (Good A) resulting from a 1% increase in the price of another good 
(Good B) (Moffatt, 2013). For example, a cross-price elasticity of wine with respect to 
beer (CPE
wine,beer
) of 0.5 implies that wine consumption increases by 5% because of a 10% 
increase in beer price. If two goods are substitutes, we should see consumers purchase 
more of one good when the price of its substitute increases. Similarly, if the two goods 
are complements, we should expect to see that a price rise in one good causes the demand 
for both goods to fall (Moffatt, 2013). If CPEoD > 0, the two goods are substitutes; if 
CPEoD = 0, the two goods are independent; if CPEoD < 0, the two goods are complements 
(Moffatt, 2013).
Price and demand under different market structures
 There are three market structures: monopolies, oligopolies and competitive markets 
(Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 2005; Malcolm, 2011; Shubik & Richard, 1980). A monopoly 
market has only one producer or retailer supplying the market. An oligopoly has a small 
number of significant producers or retailers that supply the market. A competitive market 
has a substantial number of small producers, retailers and consumers so that no single 
one can manipulate the equilibrium of market price and quantity. The explanations of 
demand-supply behaviours presented thus far assume that a competitive market exists 
for the production, sale and consumption of alcohol. However, alcohol markets in many 
countries are not competitive (Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 2005; Babor et al., 2010; 
Barzel, 1976; Keen, 1998; Myles, 1996). Most markets consist of a few large alcohol com-
panies that share the alcohol market (oligopoly market), or they are monopolies where 
the government controls the production or sale of alcohol through government-owned 
factories or retail outlets. 
 Producers in competitive markets are called “price-takers” or “price-taking firms” 
because they do not influence market price (Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 2005; Malcolm, 
2011; Shubik & Richard, 1980). The producer behaviour representing the supply curve SS 
in Fig 2.1 (the quantity produced changes when price changes) represents collective 
behaviour (all individual producers in a competitive market react in a similar way); however, 
producers at the individual level accept the market price and determine the quantity of 
production accordingly. If the production cost is higher than the market price, a producer 
will stop production. If the cost of production is lower than the market price of alcohol, 
a producer will produce alcohol at maximum capacity.
 In contrast, the producer(s) in a monopoly or oligopoly market are called 
“price-makers” or “price-making firms” because they determine the market price by 
manipulating production quantity (since a monopoly’s products supply the entire market) 
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(Shubik & Richard, 1980; Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 2005; Malcolm, 2011). The 
reactions of price makers are different under short-run and long-run conditions (Hirshleifer 
& Hirshleifer, 2005; Moffatt, 2012), and are explained below. 
Short- and long-run reactions of the alcohol market to changes in taxation 
and pricing policies
 The difference between short-run and long-run markets with respect to alcohol 
is the extent of decision-maker flexibility (Moffatt, 2012). Short-run and long-run are not 
separated by the actual time frame (Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 2005; Moffatt, 2012). 
Short-run reaction of the market represents market reaction to an imposition or increase 
in taxation that is under the condition of at least one fixed variable (e.g. consumers may 
have the same amount of money to buy alcohol, and therefore alcohol producers cannot 
increase the quality of product produced without any effect on the quantity of alcohol 
sold) (Moffatt, 2012). Long-run reaction of the market occurs when an imposition or 
increase in taxation is under the condition that all variables may change (e.g. producers 
are able to produce the same products at a lower cost, or even produce new, more attractive 
products, and consumers have higher income or greater affordability) (Moffatt, 2012).
 Because the market conditions for short-run reaction are fixed by definition, an 
alcohol price increase results in a reduction of alcohol consumption (Hirshleifer, Glazer & 
Hirshleifer, 2005). A tax increase causes consumers to consider that alcoholic beverages 
are more expensive (represented by an upward shift of the supply curve) and product 
consumption decreases correspondingly (because in a short-run market the demand curve 
is fixed) (Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 2005). In the long-run market, alcohol producers 
in an oligopoly or a monopoly can improve production technology and lower the alcohol 
price (represented by a downward shift in the supply curve). The consumption of alcohol 
will increase compared to the short-run reaction (Barzel, 1976; Keen, 1998; Myles, 1996; 
Shubik & Richard, 1980). If producers can increase the demand for a product by improving 
the product and/or increasing advertising (represented by an upward shift in the demand 
curve), alcohol consumption will increase compared to the short-run reaction (even if the 
alcohol price has previously increased because of taxation) (Barzel, 1976; Keen, 1998; 
Myles, 1996; Shubik & Richard, 1980). 
 Consequently, for oligopoly and monopoly alcohol markets, price-making producers 
can adjust their products’ quantities, quality and prices to reduce the impact of alcohol 
pricing and taxation changes in the long term (Barzel, 1976; Hirshleifer, Glazer & 
Hirshleifer, 2005; Keen, 1998; Myles, 1996; Shubik & Richard, 1980). (These product 
adjustments are explained in detail in Chapter 3.1. Thus, to examine the effectiveness of 
pricing and taxation policies, both short-term (short-run) and long-term (long-run) 
outcomes from demand and supply behaviours should be considered. 
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Alcohol excise tax, customs tax and general tax
 The three main taxes related to alcoholic beverages are: 1) general tax, 2) customs 
tax, and 3) excise tax (Cnossen, 2005). General tax is imposed on all or almost all goods 
and services (such as general sales tax [GST] and value added tax [VAT]) (Cnossen, 2005). 
Customs tax is imposed on goods imported into a particular country and creates a barrier 
to protect similar domestically produced goods (Cnossen, 2005). Excise tax is imposed 
on some specific goods – such as luxury goods and goods considered to generate negative 
externalities (such as alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, gambling instruments, oil 
and cars) (Cnossen, 2005). Table 2.1 outlines the relationships between general taxation, 
customs taxation, and excise taxation and their targeted goods. Excise taxation is 
considered the optimal tool to manipulate alcohol consumption without affecting other 
goods. Increasing customs taxation would affect imported alcohol; however, it would not 
affect domestic alcohol consumption and would affect other imported goods. 
Increasing general taxation would affect alcohol consumption, but would also affect the 
price of all other goods. Thus, excise taxation is the main instrument that governments 
use to control alcohol consumption and its related harms. 
Basic notions related to the structure of an alcoholic beverage
 There are common notions related to the structure of an alcoholic beverage. These 
notions relate to alcohol concentration, perceived quality, ethanol price, beverage price, 
and beverage price per unit of alcohol. 
 Fig. 2.4 shows a hypothetical diagram of an alcoholic beverage containing pure 
alcohol (or ethanol), water and perceived qualities. “Alcohol concentration” – the percentage 
of alcohol by volume (% ABV) – refers to the percentage of ethanol volume in the total 
volume of an alcoholic beverage. For example, a 5% beer can contain an absolute ethanol 
volume of beer of 25 cc in a 500 cc can of beer. “Perceived quality” refers to all other 
components and attributes, such as years of brewing, colour, taste, container, image 
(determined by advertising), and transportation and distribution costs. The only difference 
in any alcoholic beverage is the perceived quality component (which is assumed to cost 
Table 2.1. The relationship between three taxes on alcohol and the four types of goods
Types of goods
Alcohol
General goods
Domestic
1. Domestic alcoholic 
beverages
3. Other domestic 
goods
Imported
2. Imported alcoholic 
beverages
4. Other imported 
goods
Customs taxation
(affects 2 and 4)
General taxation 
(affects 1 to 4)
Alcohol excise 
taxation
(affects 1 and 2)
Source of Product
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more than either the ethanol or the water components). Thus, people who purchase 
alcohol consume, apart from water, ethanol and perceived qualities from any alcoholic 
beverage. If we assume that the value of pure ethanol is the same in all alcoholic beverages 
(within and across alcoholic beverage types: beer, wine, and spirits), beverage preferences 
are assumed to be a function of the value of the perceived qualities per unit of ethanol 
and affordability (Barzel, 1976).
 Ethanol price (EP) is the price of one unit of pure alcohol (ethanol) (represented 
in a unit of $/ethanol), whereas beverage price (BP) is the total price of an alcoholic 
beverage, which already includes the total price of ethanol and the price of all perceived 
qualities (represented in a unit of $/beverage). Beverage price per unit of ethanol (BPPE) 
is the BP per unit of ethanol contained in an alcoholic beverage (represented in a unit of 
$/ethanol).
 
 BPPE depends on the total value of perceived qualities per unit of ethanol, but it 
is independent of the number of units of ethanol in a beverage (see Table 2.2). BPPE is 
a good indicator for comparing the cost of various alcoholic beverages regardless of their 
alcohol concentration; hence, all explanations that follow are explained in terms of BPPE. 
The expensive alcoholic beverage (high BPPE) is a beverage that has a high value of 
perceived qualities per unit of ethanol, whereas the inexpensive alcoholic beverage (low 
BPPE) has a low value of perceived qualities per unit of ethanol.
Fig. 2.4.  A hypothetical model of an alcoholic beverage
An alcoholic beverage contains ethanol, water and perceived 
qualities. 
Ethanol is similar in beer, wine and spirits. The difference 
between them is in the value of perceived qualities only. 
“Ethanol price” is the price of one unit of pure alcohol (ethanol), 
whereas “beverage price” is the total price of an alcoholic 
beverage, which already includes the price of all perceived 
qualities. 
Beverage price per unit of ethanol is defined as beverage price 
divided by the total amount of ethanol of the beverage. The 
value depends on the value of the perceived qualities per unit 
of ethanol. 
AN ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE
Water
Pure 
alcohol 
(ethanol) Pe
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 Another significant notion with respect to tax calculations is a country’ s definition 
of an alcoholic beverage. Typically, the government determines excise tax rates for various 
alcoholic beverages; hence, there is no alcohol excise tax imposed on non-alcoholic 
beverages. Consequently, the definition of an alcoholic beverage is important. For instance, 
the government may define an alcoholic beverage as a beverage that contains at least 
2% of alcohol by volume, in which case a beverage with 1.5% of alcohol by volume would 
not be subject to alcohol excise taxation. In this case, alcohol producers may choose to 
sell 1.5% beer rather than 2% beer.
Limitations of the economic model
 The economic concepts described above assume that consumers make rational 
decisions: a price increase leads to a consumption decrease and a price decrease leads to 
a consumption increase (Hirshleifer, Glazer & Hirshleifer, 2005). Moreover, based on the 
rational addiction theory, in their decision to consume alcohol, consumers are already 
affected by the addictive factor, future cost and the harmful consequences of alcohol 
consumption (Becker & Murphy, 1988). Therefore, the consumption behaviours of demand 
and supply are predictable using rational economics theories: alcohol consumption is 
reduced by tax and price increases. However, consumers’ decisions to consume alcohol 
also depend to a substantial extent on emotion and immediate situations (such as alcohol 
Note:  Water is assumed to have no value in this equation. 
          # = number. 
Table 2.2. Equations illustrating the definitions of ethanol price (EP), beverage price (BP) 
and beverage price per unit of ethanol (BPPE)
Ethanol price (EP) ($/ethanol)
Beverage price (BP)
($/beverage)
Beverage price per unit of 
ethanol (BPPE) ($/ethanol)
= Value of one unit of ethanol
 
= Total price of an alcoholic beverage 
 
= Total price of all ethanol + the total value of perceived qualities
 
= (#of ethanol) x (EP) + total value of perceived qualities
    
= Beverage price of an alcoholic beverage (BP)
Total amount of ethanol in such beverage (#of ethanol)
= (#of ethanol) x (EP) + total value of perceived qualities
                           (#of ethanol)
= (#of ethanol) x (EP) + total value of perceived qualities
       (#of ethanol)                       (#of ethanol)
 
              = EP + total value of perceived qualities
                                (#of ethanol)
Notion Definition
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accessibility, friends and social occasions) rather than on rational acknowledgement of 
potential long-term consequences (Kahneman, 2003; Bickel & Marsch, 2001).
Summary of Section 2
 This section illustrates a number of basic economic concepts, including 
demand-supply equilibrium; price mechanisms of taxation and minimum price; price and 
tax elasticity; price and demand under different market structures; short- and long-run 
reactions of the alcohol market to changes in taxation and pricing policies; alcohol excise 
tax, customs tax and general tax; basic notions related to the structure of an alcoholic 
beverage; and limitations of the economic model. Alcohol consumption and its control 
using taxation and pricing policies operate via a mechanism of demand-supply equilibrium. 
However, the effects of taxation and pricing policies vary under different market structures, 
and time is required to measure the effects of policy implementation. To generate tax 
revenue or to control alcohol consumption, excise tax is the optimal tool that a government 
can use to target alcoholic beverages compared to customs tax and general tax. These 
concepts clarify the effect of taxation and pricing policies and allow the public health 
professional to advocate for the most effective strategy.
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Section 3
Designing taxation and pricing policies
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 To discuss and negotiate with financial officers effectively, public health personnel 
and non-economist alcohol control advocates require an understanding of taxation and 
pricing policy design. This section contains two chapters. The first chapter explains basic 
economic concepts concerning taxation and pricing policy design. The second chapter 
provides epidemiological information collected from the 2010 WHO Global Survey on 
Alcohol and Health on the taxation methods employed by countries worldwide.
Chapter 3.1
Basic economic concepts related to taxation and pricing policy design 
Bundit Sornpaisarn, Kevin D. Shield, Esa Österberg, Jürgen Rehm
 This chapter demonstrates several economic concepts related to taxation and 
pricing policy design. These include basic economic concepts of taxation methods and 
minimum pricing measures, tax base, basic economic concepts of minimum price, 
assessment of price/taxation models against the ultimate goals of price/taxation policies, 
indicators that assess the extent of a tax rate, and the limitations of an economic model.
Tax methods and tax base
 Several types of excise taxation methods are employed by countries worldwide 
(Barzel, 1976; Keen; 1998, Myles; 1996, Shubik & Richard, 1980; WHO, 2010b; Rerchuphan, 
2005). Excise taxation methods can be divided into two main groups: uniform taxation 
and combination taxation. Uniform taxation may be specific taxation, ad valorem taxation 
or unitary taxation. Combination taxation can be any combination of the three uniform 
taxations.
 In a competitive market, any type of taxation can reduce alcohol consumption 
because alcohol consumption has a negative demand slope and producers cannot influence 
market prices; taxation, the cost of production and consumer affordability influence the 
price of alcoholic beverages (Smith, 2005; Barzel, 1976; Keen, 1998; Malcolm, 2011). 
However, in oligopoly and monopoly markets, different excise taxation methods yield 
different market reactions (Smith, 2005; Barzel, 1976; Keen, 1998; Malcolm, 2011).
Uniform taxation
 The following text describes the differences between specific, ad valorem and 
unitary taxation. Table 3.1 provides a comparison of their attributes.
Section 3:
Designing taxation and pricing policies
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Specific taxation
 Specific taxation is a type of excise taxation. The tax due is calculated based on 
the amount of ethanol a beverage contains. If specific taxation rates increase, and the 
amount of ethanol and value of the perceived qualities remain the same, the after-tax 
price of the alcoholic beverage per unit of ethanol (after-tax BPPE) will increase and 
consumption will decrease in a short-run situation. This is because consumers do not 
observe a change in the value of the product, but do observe an increase in price. In 
reaction to specific taxation increases in the long-run in oligopoly or monopoly markets, 
however, alcohol producers have an incentive to improve the quality and image of their 
products to increase sales (Barzel, 1976; Smith, 2005; Keen, 1998; Myles, 1996).
 Under specific taxation, a government imposes a tax on ethanol while imposing 
no tax on perceived qualities or water. Under specific taxation, the tax due depends on 
the ethanol content; therefore, specific taxation discourages the production of high ethanol 
content beverages and encourages the production of low ethanol content beverages that 
are relatively high in perceived quality and have a good image. This is called the “upgrading 
effect.” Because BPPE depends on the value of the perceived qualities per unit of ethanol 
(see Table 2.2), increasing the value of the perceived qualities increases the beverage 
price. As a result, specific taxation encourages high BPPE, leading to a decrease in total 
alcohol consumption in oligopoly or monopoly markets (Barzel, 1976; Smith, 2005; Keen, 
1998; Myles, 1996). Tax revenue generation should increase under specific taxation because 
the proportion of total alcohol consumption reduction is less than the proportion of alcohol 
price acceleration (when the average price elasticity of market demand is less than one).
Ad valorem taxation
 Ad valorem taxation calculates the tax due based on the price of the alcoholic 
beverage. If ad valorem taxation rates increase, and the amount of ethanol and value of 
the perceived qualities remain the same, the after-tax price of the alcoholic beverage per 
unit of ethanol (after-tax BPPE) will also increase and consumption will decrease because 
consumers observe no change in the value of the product but do observe an increase in 
price. In the long-run, however, in reaction to ad valorem taxation increases in oligopoly 
or monopoly markets, alcohol producers have an incentive to adjust their products to 
reduce the tax burden per unit of ethanol (Barzel, 1976; Smith, 2005; Keen, 1998; Myles, 
1996).
 Ad valorem taxation taxes both ethanol and perceived qualities. By adding more 
ethanol, or increasing the value of perceived qualities, consumers pay for the additional 
cost of the extra ethanol or the increase in the value of the perceived qualities and pay 
for the corresponding increase in taxes (this is called the “multiplier effect”). Thus, ad 
valorem taxation encourages alcohol producers to produce perceived low-quality alcoholic 
beverages by reducing the value of the unnecessary perceived qualities (such as reducing 
the brewing period or the quality of packaging) in order to reduce the price and tax burden 
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per unit of ethanol (Barzel, 1976; Smith, 2005; Keen, 1998; Myles, 1996). Consequently, 
under ad valorem taxation, long-run alcohol prices will decrease compared to full-tax 
BPPE because of a reduction in the value of the perceived qualities per unit of ethanol 
(this is called the “downgrading effect”) (Barzel, 1976; Smith, 2005; Myles, 1996; Keen, 
1998). Ad valorem taxation also encourages producers to produce high ethanol content 
beverages to decrease the value of the perceived qualities per unit of ethanol (Barzel, 
1976; Smith, 2005; Keen, 1998; Myles, 1996). Thus, ad valorem taxation encourages the 
production and sale of high ethanol content beverages and perceived low-quality beverages, 
thus resulting in a lower beverage price (Smith, 2005; Barzel, 1976; Keen, 1998; Myles, 
1996). The lower BPPE increases total alcohol consumption when compared to the 
immediate post-taxed alcohol consumption situation under ad valorem taxation in oligopoly 
or monopoly markets. Tax revenue generation should increase under ad valorem taxation 
because total alcohol consumption increases.
Unitary taxation
 Unitary taxation is a type of excise taxation that bases the tax due for an alcoholic 
beverage on beverage volume. Some countries categorize unitary taxation as specific 
taxation that uses the volume of beverage as a tax base instead of the volume of ethanol. 
This resource tool separates unitary taxation from specific taxation because each method 
elicits a different reaction from producers. Unitary taxation is preferred for alcoholic 
beverages for which it is difficult to determine the exact ethanol concentration, such as 
wine (Rerchuphan, 2005; New Zealand Law Commission, 2010). If unitary taxation rates 
increase, and the amount of ethanol and the value of the perceived qualities remain the 
same, the after-tax price of the beverage per unit of ethanol (after-tax BPPE) will increase 
and consumption will decrease because consumers perceive the same product with a 
higher price. In the long run, and in reaction to an increase in unitary taxation in oligopoly 
or monopoly markets, we expect that alcohol producers will adjust their products by 
increasing the ethanol content to reduce the tax burden per unit of ethanol (Sornpaisarn 
et al., 2015a).
 Unitary taxation renders beverage volume a tax cost, but not alcohol content or 
perceived quality (Rerchuphan, 2005). Thus, unitary taxation encourages alcohol producers 
to produce alcoholic beverages that have a high ethanol content (Sornpaisarn et al., 2015a). 
Theoretically, under unitary taxation, alcohol producers produce, first, beverages with high 
ethanol content to reduce the tax burden per unit of ethanol, followed by a wide range 
of perceived quality alcoholic beverages (to favour consumer choice) because there is no 
tax barrier for the corresponding decision. Long-run BPPE may decrease relative to fully 
taxed BPPE because there are no tax implications associated with adding ethanol to an 
alcoholic beverage. As a result, total alcohol consumption may increase compared to the 
immediate post-taxed alcohol consumption situation under unitary taxation because this 
form of taxation does not tax alcoholic beverages based on ethanol content and favours 
consumer choice. Tax revenue generation may increase under unitary taxation because 
total alcohol consumption may increase.
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Tax base
 Tax base is an assessed value used for tax calculation. The specific taxation 
calculation is based on the amount of ethanol in an alcoholic beverage. The ad valorem 
taxation calculation is based on the price of an alcoholic beverage. Unitary taxation 
calculation is based on the total volume of an alcoholic beverage.
 The tax base of ad valorem taxation is complex. First, the ad valorem tax rate can 
be determined as a percentage of the retail price or of the producer price (or ex-factory 
price). The relationship between producer price and retail price is the following: producer 
price incorporates the production (and/or advertising and transportation) costs plus a 
producer profit charged for an alcoholic beverage. Retail price incorporates producer price, 
the retail sale cost, the retailer profit and various types of taxes. However, in the interests 
of economic theory simplification, all costs and profits of producers and sellers are combined 
as a cost. Therefore, the main components in any price and taxation policy economic 
theory are cost, tax and price inclusive of tax.
a BPPE: beverage price per unit of ethanol.
Table 3.1.  A comparison of the attributes of three taxation methods (specific, ad valorem 
and unitary) in oligopoly or monopoly markets
Tax base
Tax function
Effect of taxation 
on producers’ 
adjustment in the 
long run
Effect on BPPEa
Effect on alcohol 
consumption
Effect on tax 
revenue genera-
tion
Specific taxation
Volume of ethanol
Ethanol has a tax cost; 
perceived qualities 
have no tax cost
Encourages production 
of low ethanol content 
beverages and high 
perceived quality 
alcoholic beverages
BPPE increase
Total consumption 
decreases
Alcohol tax revenue 
increases
Ad valorem taxation
Beverage price
Everything has a tax 
cost
Encourages production 
of high ethanol content 
beverages and low 
perceived quality 
alcoholic beverages
BPPE decrease
Total consumption 
increases when com-
pared to the immediate 
post-taxed alcohol 
consumption situation
Alcohol tax revenue 
increases (to a greater 
extent than under 
specific taxation)
Unitary taxation
Volume of beverage
Container size has a tax 
cost; both alcohol and 
perceived qualities have 
no tax cost
Encourages production 
of high ethanol content 
beverages with a wide 
variety of perceived 
qualities
BPPE may decrease
Total consumption may 
increase as compared to 
the immediate post-
taxed alcohol consump-
tion situation
Alcohol tax revenue may 
increase
Type of taxation
Attributes
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 Second, the ad valorem tax rate can be determined in terms of inclusive and 
exclusive tax rates. The tax base of the inclusive tax rate is the price that already includes 
tax, whereas the tax base of the exclusive tax rate is the price that excludes tax. For 
example, if the cost of an alcoholic beverage is US$ 1 and the excise tax is US$ 0.50, the 
retail price (inclusive of tax) is US$ 1.50. The ad valorem inclusive tax rate is 33% (US$ 
0.50/US$ 1.50), whereas the ad valorem exclusive tax rate is 50% (US$ 0.50/US$ 1). 
Therefore, the tax base of the ad valorem tax rate must be clearly articulated.
Combination taxation
 Combination taxation is defined as a combination of two or more of the basic 
taxation methods. Combination taxation typically occurs by 1) calculating the tax due on 
an alcoholic beverage by combining specific taxation and ad valorem taxation, or 2) 
calculating the tax of each alcoholic beverage using both the specific and ad valorem 
taxation methods with the beverage tax determined as the higher of the two calculations. 
The WHO technical manual on tobacco tax administration refers to the above-described 
first combination of taxation as “mixed specific and ad valorem taxation” (MSA) and the 
second combination of taxation as “ad valorem with specific floor taxation” (ASF) (WHO, 
2010b). The MSA taxation model is widely used in European countries (Cnossen, 2001), 
whereas the ASF taxation model is employed in Thailand (Sornpaisarn et al., 2012a; 
Sornpaisarn et al., 2012b) and in Turkey (OECD iLibrary, 2012).
 The properties of MSA taxation and ASF taxation are outlined below based on 
simulated data (Sornpaisarn et al., 2015a). For both examples, 100 alcoholic beverages 
were simulated that fell equally under 10 beverage categories and that differed in ethanol 
content (from one to 10 units of ethanol per beverage). Within each category, the beverages 
differed in value of the perceived qualities per beverage (from one to 10 units of perceived 
quality value per beverage). The price per unit of ethanol and per perceived quality, and 
the value of tax rates for both specific and ad valorem taxation, were assigned. For the 
100 simulated alcoholic beverages, the beverage price ($/bottle) and the beverage price 
per unit of ethanol (BPPE, $/unit of ethanol) were estimated. For the MSA example, based 
on the beverage price and the BPPE, the tax due and the average tax rate per unit of 
ethanol were calculated using the four following taxation models: 1) ad valorem taxation, 
2) MSA taxation favouring ad valorem taxation, 3) MSA taxation favouring specific taxation, 
and 4) specific taxation. (See the next paragraph for the meaning of MSA favouring 
specific taxation and MSA favouring ad valorem taxation.) For the ASF example, both 
specific and ad valorem taxation were calculated for each of the 100 simulated alcoholic 
beverages described; however, the tax due on each of the beverages was the higher of 
the two calculations.
Mixed specific and ad valorem taxation (MSA)
 Among the European Union (EU) countries that use MSA taxation, the northern 
EU countries favour specific taxation (that is, the specific tax rate is greater than the ad 
valorem tax rate), whereas the southern EU countries favour ad valorem taxation (that 
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is, the specific tax rate is less than the ad valorem tax rate) (Cnossen, 2001). MSA taxation 
has attributes of both specific taxation and ad valorem taxation; however, the attributes 
of MSA taxation depend on the relative magnitude of the specific and ad valorem tax 
rates.
 Taking the 100 simulated alcoholic beverages described above, Fig. 3.1 illustrates 
the average tax rate per unit of ethanol change based on the value of the perceived 
qualities per unit of ethanol for an alcoholic beverage under the four taxation systems. 
Specific taxation imposes an equal tax rate per unit of ethanol regardless of the value of 
the perceived qualities per unit of ethanol (the purple horizontal line). Ad valorem taxation 
imposes a tax based on the value of the perceived qualities per unit of ethanol (the blue 
highest slope line). MSA taxation favouring specific taxation has an attribute close to 
specific taxation (the green line that is less steep), whereas MSA taxation favouring ad 
valorem taxation has an attribute closer to ad valorem taxation (the red line with the 
steeper slope. Thus, by incentivizing producers to upgrade or increase the value of the 
perceived qualities per unit of ethanol, specific taxation causes the price of alcohol (BPPE) 
to increase and total alcohol consumption to decrease. Ad valorem taxation imposes a tax 
based on the value of the perceived qualities per unit of ethanol, leading producers to 
downgrade or decrease the perceived qualities in their products and resulting in a lower 
alcohol price and an increase in alcohol consumption. MSA taxation favouring specific 
taxation resembles specific taxation in its effect, whereas MSA taxation favouring ad 
valorem taxation resembles ad valorem taxation in its effect.
Note: MSA, mixed specific and ad valorem taxation; Sp, specific taxation; AV, ad valorem 
taxation.
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Fig. 3.1. A comparison of the tax rate per unit of ethanol for four types of taxation: 
specific (SP), MSA favouring specific, MSA favouring ad valorem, and ad valorem (AV)
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 Specific taxation promotes the production of low alcohol content beverages 
(upgrading effect), and ad valorem taxation promotes the production of high alcohol 
content beverages (downgrading effect). MSA taxation promotes the production of medium 
alcoholic content beverages because MSA combines the attributes of both taxation 
methods. 
Ad valorem with specific floor taxation (ASF)
 Fig. 3.2 illustrates the average tax rate per unit of ethanol change based on the 
value of the perceived qualities per unit of ethanol for an alcoholic beverage under ASF 
taxation, specific taxation and ad valorem taxation. We observe that the specific tax rates 
for lower perceived quality alcoholic beverages (beverage numbers 1-3 in Fig. 3.2) are 
higher than their ad valorem tax rates. Thus, for the lower perceived quality alcoholic 
beverages, the ASF tax rate is equal to the specific tax rate. For alcoholic beverages of 
higher perceived quality (beverages 4-10), which are generally more expensive, the ad 
valorem tax rate is higher than the specific tax rate. Conversely, for higher perceived 
quality alcoholic beverages, the ASF tax rate is equal to the ad valorem tax rate. This 
change in the effective tax rate for ASF taxation creates a taxation structure that is 
termed “ad valorem with specific floor taxation.”
 ASF can also be considered “specific-plus taxation.” This is because ASF taxation 
is equal to specific taxation plus the area between specific taxation and ad valorem 
taxation in Fig. 3.2. Thus, for ASF taxation for all alcoholic beverages, the tax due is equal 
to the specific tax rates and the difference between the ad valorem tax rate and the 
specific tax rates (if the ad valorem tax rate is greater than the specific tax rate).
 The advantages of ASF compared to specific taxation include: 1) ASF taxation has 
a higher average tax rate, greater tax revenue generation, and will result in lower total 
alcohol consumption (Sornpaisarn et al., 2012a; Sornpaisarn et al., 2016), and 2) ASF 
taxation can prevent drinking initiation (particularly in countries with a high prevalence 
of lifetime abstainers) because the tax due on low ethanol content beverages (which 
young people tend to consume when initiating drinking) is higher than under specific 
taxation (Sornpaisarn et al., 2012a; Sornpaisarn et al., 2015b). The disadvantage of ASF 
compared to specific taxation is that producers under ASF have no incentive to produce 
high-quality alcoholic beverages in the expensive alcohol category. This reduces the variety 
of high-price beverages.
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Homogeneity of tax method system design and tax rate determination
 The complexity of the excise taxation system in a specific country can be the 
result of a combination of two factors: the homogeneity of tax methods applied and the 
homogeneity of tax rates employed. The possible taxation policy approaches that the 
government can utilize to address this combination are as follows:
Note: ASF, ad valorem with specific floor. 
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Homogeneity of tax methods employed and tax rates applied to all types of alcoholic 
beverages: the government employs only one type of taxation method (specific, ad 
valorem, unitary, MSA, ASF or others) for all types of alcoholic beverages and applies 
a uniform tax rate to all alcoholic beverages.
Homogeneity of tax methods employed for all types of alcoholic beverages, but 
heterogeneity of tax rates employed for different categories of alcoholic beverages 
(beer, wine, spirits): the government employs only one type of taxation method for all 
types of alcoholic beverages, but employs differential tax rates for different categories 
of alcoholic beverages. Thailand is an example of a country that employs this tax policy 
approach because the government employs ASF for all types of alcoholic beverages 
but applies differential tax rates to different categories of alcoholic beverages 
(Sornpaisarn et al., 2012a).
Heterogeneity of tax methods employed and tax rates applied to different categories 
of alcoholic beverages (beer, wine, spirits): the government employs more than one 
type of taxation method to alcoholic beverage categories; however, this approach 
consequently cannot apply a uniform tax rate approach. Alcohol excise tax in Australia, 
3.
Fig. 3.2.  A comparison of the tax rate per unit of ethanol for three types of taxation (ad 
valorem with specific floor, specific and ad valorem)
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 Differential tax methods and tax rates yield differential actual tax rates between 
alcoholic beverage categories, resulting in some categories being favoured over others. 
The reasons supporting government application of the differential tax method and tax 
rate policy approach are the following. First, the differential tax method and tax rate 
policy approach can be considered if it results in different alcoholic beverage consumption 
and the government wishes to discourage the consumption of certain beverages (New 
Zealand Law Commission, 2010). For instance, in some countries, such as China, the 
government may wish to discourage the troublesome tradition of the consumption of 
heavy spirits. Second, spirits should be taxed at higher rates because the production cost 
is less than the production cost for beer and wine. A higher tax rate on spirits will bring 
the price of spirits per unit of ethanol in line with other alcoholic beverages (New Zealand 
Law Commission, 2010). Third, taxing spirits at a higher rate is based on a justification 
of progressivity because spirits are considered luxury products favoured by the rich in 
some countries, such as New Zealand (New Zealand Law Commission, 2010) and the EU 
countries (New Zealand Law Commission, 2010; Smith, 2005).
 The reasons for the government to apply a uniform tax method and tax rate 
policy approach are the following. First, alcohol produces similar consequences regardless 
of the beverage type; the consequences of different alcoholic beverages in the market 
are already the result of differential tax rates among various types of alcoholic beverages 
(New Zealand Law Commission, 2010; Smith, 2005). For instance, spirits might not currently 
cause major externalities in EU countries if a high price confines consumption to richer 
consumers who are interested in attributes unrelated to alcohol. However, this does not 
inform us of the level of externalities that would be related to spirits consumption if 
spirits were taxed at the same rate per unit of alcohol as beer and wine (Smith, 2005). 
Second, higher tax rates produce greater welfare losses to non-abusive consumers in 
proportion to the square term of the tax rate; hence, the greater the difference in tax 
rates across beverage type, the higher the cost of welfare loss for non-abusive consumers 
(Smith, 2005). Third, there is a substitution effect between differently taxed alcoholic 
beverages because consumers shift their beverage choices toward alcoholic beverages 
with less tax (New Zealand Law Commission, 2010). For instance, the ready-to-drink (RTD) 
taxation increase in 2008 in New Zealand reduced RTD consumption by 35%, increased 
the consumption of spirits by 18%, and the consumption of beer by 5%, and the total 
excisable alcoholic beverages consumption declined by 0.5% (New Zealand Law Commission, 
2010). Fourth, the government can determine other alcohol control policies to regulate 
beverage-specific consumption that produces higher externality.
 A number of countries employ the differential tax method policy approach (see 
Chapter 3.2) and almost all countries worldwide, if not all, apply differential tax rates for 
for instance, is based on beverage type and ethanol content, with beer and spirits taxed 
under a specific taxation structure and wine taxed under an ad valorem taxation 
structure (Australian Government, Department of Health and Ageing, 2013). Accordingly, 
the specific tax rate for beer and spirits is distinct from the ad valorem tax rate for 
wine.
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different types of alcoholic beverages, such as the EU countries (Smith, 2005), African 
countries (Bird, 2010) and countries of South-East Asia (Rerchuphan, 2005).
The basic economic concept of minimum price
Minimum pricing per unit of ethanol is a measure imposed by governments that 
prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages to consumers below a designated price. The price 
of a lower-priced alcoholic beverage will increase after the introduction of a minimum 
price, and consumption will decrease because consumers will observe the same product 
with a higher price. Accordingly, minimum pricing affects the sale of low-priced beverages 
and reduces alcohol consumption and its related harms among heavy drinkers and the 
poor. These are the groups of people who experience the greatest harm from alcohol 
consumption because heavy drinkers and low-income groups typically consume low-priced 
alcoholic beverages (Meier et al., 2009). Indeed, there is evidence that minimum pricing 
in Canada reduced alcohol consumption (Stockwell et al., 2012) and alcohol-attributable 
hospital admissions (Stockwell et al., 2013).
Assessing price/taxation models against the ultimate goals of price/taxation 
policies
A government alcohol excise taxation model should consider three goals: 1) tax 
revenue generation, 2) control of alcohol consumed by drinkers and the public health 
problems caused by alcohol consumption, and 3) prevention of drinking initiation (for 
countries with a high prevalence of lifetime abstention). Here we compare various models 
of price/taxation measures that consider these goals under oligopoly and monopoly markets 
(see Table 3.2).
Specific taxation reduces alcohol consumption and its related harms and increases 
tax revenue generation. However, specific taxation may encourage drinking initiation 
among young people in countries with a high prevalence of lifetime abstention because 
young people typically consume low ethanol content beverages (that are not taxed heavily 
under specific taxation) when initiating drinking. 
Ad valorem taxation increases tax revenue generation, but also increases total 
alcohol consumption and drinking initiation (because ad valorem taxation promotes low-cost 
alcoholic beverages).
Unitary taxation promotes inexpensive high ethanol content beverages and a wide 
variety of product qualities. Thus, unitary taxation is neither likely to decrease alcohol 
consumption and its related harms nor prevent drinking initiation. However, unitary taxation 
increases the generation of tax revenue.
MSA taxation has attributes of both specific and ad valorem taxation, with the 
effects of MSA taxation depending on the proportion between the specific and ad valorem 
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tax rates. Thus, MSA is less effective than uniform specific taxation in controlling alcohol 
consumption because, relatively, it promotes lower-cost alcoholic beverages. However, 
MSA may prevent drinking initiation because it promotes medium alcohol content beverages. 
A low alcohol content beverage under MSA has a higher tax cost compared to uniform 
specific taxation because MSA includes a higher tax rate based on its component of ad 
valorem tax.
 ASF taxation or “specific-plus taxation” reduces alcohol consumption and its related 
harms, prevents drinking initiation, and increases tax revenue generation when compared 
to specific taxation. ASF taxation is effective in reducing alcohol-related harms because 
the tax due on any alcoholic beverage is never less than the calculated specific taxation 
rate. ASF taxation prevents drinking initiation because it heavily taxes low ethanol content 
beverages (preferred by young people when initiating drinking). ASF taxation also increases 
tax revenue generation; however, compared to specific taxation, ASF taxation may generate 
lower tax revenues from expensive beverages (if these beverages are elastic compared 
to inexpensive alcoholic beverages).
 Minimum pricing per unit of ethanol has attributes similar to specific taxation 
because both are based on ethanol content. However, minimum pricing reduces consumption 
of, and the related harms caused by, the lowest-priced alcoholic beverages. When minimum 
pricing is applied in conjunction with taxation, tax revenues are generated and the difference 
between minimum price and the price of the taxed alcoholic beverage represents profit 
for alcohol companies. The ability of minimum pricing to prevent drinking initiation is 
unknown because low ethanol content beverages are normally expensive and thus are not 
affected by the minimum price policy. Governments should consider implementing minimum 
pricing policies in circumstances where significant harm is caused by lower-priced alcoholic 
beverages.
 The literature has theoretically and empirically assessed the attributes of 
specific and ad valorem taxation (Smith, 2005; Barzel, 1976; Keen, 1998; Myles, 1996). 
Additional empirical studies are required to evaluate the theoretical assessment of the 
attributes of unitary, MSA and ASF taxation.
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Indicators that assess the extent of a tax rate
 Two indicators assess the extent of a tax rate: the tax due as a percentage of 
retail price (TPP) and the tax due per unit of ethanol (TPU). TPP is the proportion of tax 
of an alcoholic beverage compared to the total retail price of the beverage by percentage. 
TPU is calculated using the tax amount of an alcoholic beverage divided by the amount 
of ethanol in that beverage. For example, suppose that an alcoholic beverage has 10 units 
of ethanol, a tax of $ 10 and a retail price of $ 20. The TPP is 50% ($ 10/$ 20), whereas 
its TPU is $ 1 per unit of ethanol ($ 10/10 units). (The BPPE of this beverage is $ 2 per 
unit of ethanol ($20 / 10 units).) TPP represents the tax burden per unit of purchasing 
money regardless of ethanol; this indicator is superior for measuring tax incidence, which 
measures the tax burden on the distribution of income. TPU represents the tax burden 
per unit of ethanol regardless of beverage price; this indicator is superior in measuring 
the burden of tax imposed on each unit of ethanol. Hence, both indicators should be 
applied in a comparison of the extent of alcohol excise tax rates between countries.
Table 3.2.  A comparison of the various pricing and taxation model attributes in oligopoly 
and monopoly markets
Tax Method 
Specific taxation (Sp)
Ad valorem taxation 
(AV)
Unitary taxation
Mixed Sp and AV 
favouring specific 
(MSA-Sp)
Mixed Sp and AV 
favouring ad valorem 
(MSA-AV)
Ad valorem with 
specific floor (ASF) (or 
specific-plus taxation)
Minimum price with 
taxation
Tax revenue
generation
Yes
Yes, more than specific 
taxation
Yes
Close to Sp
Close to AV
Yes, when compared to Sp
Yes
(The amount of tax 
revenue depends on which 
type of taxation is 
applied). The difference 
between minimum price 
and price inclusive of tax 
represents profit for 
alcohol companies
Consumption and harm 
reduction
Yes
No, when compared to Sp
No, when compared to Sp 
Close to Sp
Close to AV
Yes, when compared to Sp
Yes
(Among the lowest-priced 
beverages)
Drinking initiation 
prevention
May exacerbate drinking 
initiation in LMICs
No
No
Somewhat, yes
Somewhat, yes
Yes, when compared to Sp
Uncertainty
(Because low ethanol 
content beverages are not 
the least-expensive 
alcoholic beverages in 
terms of price per unit of 
ethanol)
Attributes
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Summary of chapter 3.1
 Several types of alcohol excise taxation methods are employed worldwide. These 
include uniform tax methods – such as specific taxation, ad valorem taxation and unitary 
taxation – and combination tax methods – such as mixed specific and ad valorem taxation 
and ad valorem with specific floor taxation. All of these methods have different attributes 
and may be appropriate for different contexts and the different alcohol control objectives 
of countries.
 Governments should consider three goals when considering an alcohol excise 
taxation model: 1) tax revenue generation, 2) control of alcohol consumed by drinkers and 
public health problems caused by alcohol consumption, and 3) prevention of drinking 
initiation (for countries with a high prevalence of lifetime abstention). Assuming these 
three goals, specific taxation may be appropriate for high-income countries that have a 
high prevalence of drinkers because it promotes the consumption of low alcohol content 
beverages, which results in a reduction in total alcohol consumption. Mixed specific and 
ad valorem taxation (MSA) and ad valorem with specific floor taxation (ASF) may be 
appropriate for LMICs because it promotes the consumption of medium alcohol content 
beverages, which is expected to reduce total alcohol consumption among heavy drinkers 
and prevent drinking initiation among young people. The government may apply a minimum 
price measure as a method of controlling problems caused by the cheapest alcoholic 
beverages.
 Two indicators are used to assess the extent of a tax rate – the tax due as a 
percentage of retail price (TPP) and the tax due per unit of ethanol (TPU). The former 
indicator is superior in measuring tax incidence, which measures the tax burden on the 
distribution of income, whereas the latter is superior in measuring the burden of tax 
imposed on each unit of ethanol. Both indicators should be applied in a comparison between 
countries of the extent of alcohol excise tax rates.
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Chapter 3.2
Taxation and pricing policies among countries worldwide: results from the 
2012 Global Survey on Alcohol and Health
Jürgen Rehm, Kevin D. Shield
The 2012 Global Survey on Alcohol and Health
The WHO has collected alcohol consumption and control policy data from Member 
States since 1996 using the Global Survey on Alcohol and Health (GSAH). In addition to 
collecting comparable information at the global level, the GSAH is instrumental in developing 
regional and global information systems on alcohol and health, as required by the World 
Health Assembly Resolution on “Public Health Problems Caused by Harmful Use of Alcohol.” 
The information provided by the Member States is published in the Global Status Report 
on Alcohol and Health (2014), as well as in WHO regional publications.
Previous publications that have reported GSAH data have not reported on the 
taxation systems of the Member States but have reported on subjects such as the legal 
drinking age, drink-driving laws and whether excise taxation is applied to alcohol. The 
2012 GSAH collected information on the types of excise taxes applied to various alcoholic 
beverages and the amount of tax collected for these alcoholic beverages, thereby providing 
a unique opportunity to study global alcohol taxation and pricing policies.
This chapter presents the results of the 2012 GSAH respecting taxation by country, 
and provides an overview of the taxation methods employed.
Methodology of the 2012 Global Survey on Alcohol and Health and the sources of other 
data
The 2012 GSAH was conducted in collaboration with all six WHO regional offices 
(Africa, the Americas, Eastern Mediterranean, Europe, South-East Asia and Western 
Pacific). The 2012 GSAH was sent to WHO Member States for completion by national 
representatives who were officially nominated by the Member States’ ministries of health. 
Additionally, data were collected in conjunction with the European Commission in countries 
belonging to the EU. During questionnaire development, comments were solicited from 
WHO regional offices, the European Commission and a group of experts. The questionnaire, 
which was initially prepared in English and then translated into French, Portuguese, Russian 
and Spanish, was divided into three sections: Section A addressed alcohol policy, Section 
B addressed alcohol consumption, and Section C addressed alcohol and health indicators. 
We supplemented the data collected from the 2012 GSAH with additional data 
from another source; data on recorded, unrecorded and tourist alcohol consumption were 
also obtained from a paper by Shield and colleagues (Shield et al., 2013a).
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Religious bans on alcohol production and/or consumption
 Some countries ban the production and/or consumption of alcohol, usually for 
religious reasons. The 2012 GSAH found that Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
the Maldives, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen – representing 3.9% of the 
countries surveyed – had laws that prohibited the production and/or consumption of 
alcohol. In these countries, Islam is the predominant religion and is practised by the majority 
of the population. Although the production and/or consumption of alcohol is illegal in these 
countries, recorded per capita alcohol consumption for 2005 in these countries was, on 
average, 0.39 litres of pure alcohol (ranging from zero litres in Afghanistan, Iran, Mauritania 
and Yemen to 1.5 litres in Sudan). Unrecorded per capita alcohol consumption was, on 
average, 0.43 litres of pure alcohol (ranging from zero litres in Afghanistan to one litre in 
Iran and Sudan) and total per capita alcohol consumption, on average, was 0.67 litres of 
pure alcohol (ranging from zero litres in Afghanistan to 2.5 litres in Sudan). However, as 
measured by the 2010 GSAH, per capita alcohol consumption in these countries was, on 
average, 0.8 litres of pure alcohol (ranging from 0.02 litres in Afghanistan to 2.56 litres 
in Sudan), with 0.49 litres of the total per capita consumption derived from consumption 
of unrecorded alcohol (ranging from 0.02 litres in Afghanistan to one litre in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Sudan).
Value added tax on alcoholic beverages by country
 Of the 175 countries that provided data on sales tax, 151 applied a form of value 
added tax to alcohol (the other 24 countries did not have a value added tax, or the 
production or consumption of alcohol was illegal). The average sales tax rate on alcohol 
varied from 3% in the Federated States of Micronesia to 30% in Sierra Leone and Tajikistan, 
with an average sales tax rate of 16.6% (standard deviation of 4.9%). Fig. 3.3 outlines the 
sales tax rates in 2012 by country.
Excise tax on alcoholic beverages by country
 For historical reasons, in some countries alcoholic beverages are currently not 
taxed. Of the countries surveyed in the 2012 GSAH where alcohol consumption was not 
banned, 11 countries did not apply excise tax on beer, 28 countries did not apply excise 
tax on wine, and 15 countries did not apply excise tax on spirits (10 countries did not tax 
any alcoholic beverages). Fig. 3.4 lists the countries that do and do not apply excise tax 
on beer, wine and spirits, and those countries where the consumption of alcohol is illegal. 
 The method of calculating the excise tax payable on alcohol varies globally, with 
countries using ad valorem taxation, specific taxation, unitary taxation and a combination 
of taxation methods. Fig. 3.5 outlines the different excise taxation methods reported by 
the 2012 GSAH. 
47
Resource tool on 
alcohol taxation and pricing policies
V
al
ue
 a
dd
ed
 ta
x 
ra
te
s
>3
0%
22
%
 to
 <
30
%
20
%
 to
 <
22
%
18
%
 to
 <
20
%
15
%
 to
 <
18
%
10
%
 to
 <
15
%
<1
0%
N
o 
da
ta
N
ot
 a
pp
lic
ab
le
©
W
HO
20
15
.A
llr
ig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
Th
e
bo
un
da
rie
s
an
d
na
m
es
sh
ow
n
an
d
th
e
de
sig
na
tio
ns
us
ed
on
th
is
m
ap
do
no
ti
m
pl
y
th
e
ex
pr
es
sio
n
of
an
y
op
in
io
n
wh
at
so
ev
er
on
th
e
pa
rt
of
th
e
W
or
ld
He
al
th
O
rg
an
iza
tio
n
co
nc
er
ni
ng
th
e
le
ga
ls
ta
tu
s
of
an
y
co
un
try
te
rri
to
ry
cit
y
or
ar
ea
or
of
its
au
th
or
itie
s
or
co
nc
er
ni
ng
th
e
de
lim
ita
tio
n
of
its
fro
nt
ie
rs
or
bo
un
da
rie
s.
Do
tte
d
an
d
da
sh
ed
lin
es
on
m
ap
s
re
pr
es
en
ta
pp
ro
xim
at
e
bo
rd
er
lin
es
fo
rw
hi
ch
th
er
e
m
ay
no
ty
et
be
fu
lla
gr
ee
m
en
t.
© 
W
HO
 2
01
7.
 A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
©
W
HO
20
15
.A
llr
ig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
Th
e
bo
un
da
rie
s
an
d
na
m
es
sh
ow
n
an
d
th
e
de
sig
na
tio
ns
us
ed
on
th
is
m
ap
do
no
ti
m
pl
y
th
e
ex
pr
es
sio
n
of
an
y
op
in
io
n
wh
at
so
ev
er
on
th
e
pa
rt
of
th
e
W
or
ld
He
al
th
O
rg
an
iza
tio
n
co
nc
er
ni
ng
th
e
le
ga
ls
ta
tu
s
of
an
y
co
un
try
te
rri
to
ry
cit
y
or
ar
ea
or
of
its
au
th
or
itie
s
or
co
nc
er
ni
ng
th
e
de
lim
ita
tio
n
of
its
fro
nt
ie
rs
or
bo
un
da
rie
s.
Do
tte
d
an
d
da
sh
ed
lin
es
on
m
ap
s
re
pr
es
en
ta
pp
ro
xim
at
e
bo
rd
er
lin
es
fo
rw
hi
ch
th
er
e
m
ay
no
ty
et
be
fu
lla
gr
ee
m
en
t.
Fi
g.
 3
.3
.  
Re
po
rt
ed
 v
al
ue
 a
dd
ed
 t
ax
 ra
te
s 
by
 c
ou
nt
ry
 fo
r 
20
12
48
R
es
ou
rc
e 
to
ol
 o
n 
al
co
ho
l t
ax
at
io
n 
an
d 
pr
ic
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s
A
lc
oh
ol
 e
xc
is
e 
ta
xa
tio
n
N
o 
al
co
ho
l e
xc
is
e 
ta
xa
tio
n
A
lc
oh
ol
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
an
d 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
ba
nn
ed
A
lc
oh
ol
 e
xc
is
e 
ta
x 
ap
pl
ie
d 
to
 b
ee
r a
nd
 w
in
e
A
lc
oh
ol
 e
xc
is
e 
ta
x 
ap
pl
ie
d 
to
 b
ee
r a
nd
 s
pi
rit
s
A
lc
oh
ol
 e
xc
is
e 
ta
x 
ap
pl
ie
d 
to
 w
in
e 
an
d 
sp
iri
ts
A
lc
oh
ol
 e
xc
is
e 
ta
x 
ap
pl
ie
d 
to
 b
ee
r
A
lc
oh
ol
 e
xc
is
e 
ta
x 
ap
pl
ie
d 
to
 b
ee
r w
in
e 
an
d 
sp
iri
ts
N
o 
da
ta
N
ot
 a
pp
lic
ab
le
©
W
HO
20
15
.A
llr
ig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
Th
e
bo
un
da
rie
s
an
d
na
m
es
sh
ow
n
an
d
th
e
de
sig
na
tio
ns
us
ed
on
th
is
m
ap
do
no
ti
m
pl
y
th
e
ex
pr
es
sio
n
of
an
y
op
in
io
n
wh
at
so
ev
er
on
th
e
pa
rt
of
th
e
W
or
ld
He
al
th
O
rg
an
iza
tio
n
co
nc
er
ni
ng
th
e
le
ga
ls
ta
tu
s
of
an
y
co
un
try
te
rri
to
ry
cit
y
or
ar
ea
or
of
its
au
th
or
itie
s
or
co
nc
er
ni
ng
th
e
de
lim
ita
tio
n
of
its
fro
nt
ie
rs
or
bo
un
da
rie
s.
Do
tte
d
an
d
da
sh
ed
lin
es
on
m
ap
s
re
pr
es
en
ta
pp
ro
xim
at
e
bo
rd
er
lin
es
fo
rw
hi
ch
th
er
e
m
ay
no
ty
et
be
fu
lla
gr
ee
m
en
t.
© 
W
HO
 2
01
7.
 A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
©
W
HO
20
15
.A
llr
ig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
Th
e
bo
un
da
rie
s
an
d
na
m
es
sh
ow
n
an
d
th
e
de
sig
na
tio
ns
us
ed
on
th
is
m
ap
do
no
ti
m
pl
y
th
e
ex
pr
es
sio
n
of
an
y
op
in
io
n
wh
at
so
ev
er
on
th
e
pa
rt
of
th
e
W
or
ld
He
al
th
O
rg
an
iza
tio
n
co
nc
er
ni
ng
th
e
le
ga
ls
ta
tu
s
of
an
y
co
un
try
te
rri
to
ry
cit
y
or
ar
ea
or
of
its
au
th
or
itie
s
or
co
nc
er
ni
ng
th
e
de
lim
ita
tio
n
of
its
fro
nt
ie
rs
or
bo
un
da
rie
s.
Do
tte
d
an
d
da
sh
ed
lin
es
on
m
ap
s
re
pr
es
en
ta
pp
ro
xim
at
e
bo
rd
er
lin
es
fo
rw
hi
ch
th
er
e
m
ay
no
ty
et
be
fu
lla
gr
ee
m
en
t.
Fi
g.
 3
.4
. R
ep
or
te
d 
va
lu
e 
ad
de
d 
ta
x 
ra
te
s 
by
 c
ou
nt
ry
 fo
r 
20
12
49
Resource tool on 
alcohol taxation and pricing policies
Fi
g.
 3
.5
. A
lco
ho
l e
xc
is
e 
ta
xa
tio
n 
m
et
ho
ds
 re
po
rt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
20
12
 G
lo
ba
l S
ur
ve
y 
on
 A
lco
ho
l a
nd
 H
ea
lth
Sp
ec
ifi
c,
 a
d 
va
lo
re
m
 
an
d 
un
ita
ry
 t
ax
at
io
n 
(N
=4
)
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
an
d
ad
 v
al
or
em
 
ta
xa
tio
n 
(N
=6
)
Co
un
tr
ie
s 
w
ith
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 a
lc
oh
ol
 t
ax
at
io
n 
(N
=1
77
)
Co
un
tr
ie
s 
th
at
 b
an
 a
lc
oh
ol
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n/
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
(N
=7
)
N
o 
ta
x 
on
 a
ny
 a
lc
oh
ol
ic
 
be
ve
ra
ge
 (N
=1
0)
N
o 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 
ta
xa
tio
n 
ty
pe
s 
(N
=1
9)
O
th
er
 t
ax
es
 
(N
=3
)
Ad
 v
al
or
em
 t
ax
at
io
n 
on
ly
 (N
=4
6)
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
ta
xa
tio
n 
on
ly
 (N
=2
4)
Ad
 v
al
or
em
 w
ith
 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
flo
or
 (N
=5
)
Ad
 v
al
or
em
 a
nd
 
un
ita
ry
 t
ax
at
io
n 
(N
=1
)
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
an
d 
ad
 
va
lo
re
m
 t
ax
at
io
n 
(N
=7
)
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
an
d 
un
ita
ry
 (N
=1
)
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
w
ith
 u
ni
ta
ry
 
flo
or
 (N
=1
)
Co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
us
ed
 
bu
t 
no
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
ov
id
ed
 (N
=4
)
A 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
m
et
ho
ds
 w
as
 
us
ed
 b
ut
 n
o 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
w
as
 
pr
ov
id
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
m
et
ho
ds
 o
f 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
 (N
=5
)
Un
ita
ry
 t
ax
at
io
n 
on
ly
 (N
=5
)
Th
e 
us
e 
of
 t
w
o 
or
 m
or
e 
ta
xa
tio
n 
sy
st
em
s(
 N
=6
3)
Co
un
tr
ie
s 
w
hi
ch
 d
o 
no
t 
ba
n 
al
co
ho
l c
on
su
m
pt
io
n/
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
bu
t 
ta
x 
at
 le
as
t 
on
e 
ty
pe
 o
f 
al
co
ho
lic
 
be
ve
ra
ge
 (N
=1
60
)
N
o 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 if
 t
ax
at
io
n 
is
 u
se
d 
in
  c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
(N
=3
8)
Ta
x 
du
e 
is
 t
he
 h
ig
he
r 
of
 t
he
 t
w
o 
ta
x 
m
et
ho
ds
 u
se
d 
(N
=7
)
Ta
xa
tio
n 
m
et
ho
ds
 a
re
 
su
m
m
ed
 fo
r 
ea
ch
 
al
co
ho
lic
 b
ev
er
ag
e 
(N
=1
3)
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
(N
=2
5)
Ad
 v
al
or
em
 a
nd
 
un
ita
ry
 t
ax
at
io
n 
(N
=2
6)
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
an
d 
un
ita
ry
 t
ax
at
io
n 
(N
=2
)
Ad
 v
al
or
em
 w
ith
 
un
ita
ry
 f
lo
or
 (N
=1
)
50
R
es
ou
rc
e 
to
ol
 o
n 
al
co
ho
l t
ax
at
io
n 
an
d 
pr
ic
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s
 Of the countries that did not ban alcohol consumption and taxed alcohol using an 
excise tax, 19 did not provide any information on the type of alcohol taxation applied. Of 
the countries that provided information on excise taxation, three countries applied unique 
excise tax to alcoholic beverages (the Bahamas implemented a royalty tax that was 
collected on alcoholic beverages produced locally, Guinea-Bissau applied a special tax on 
alcohol sales, and Oman taxed all alcohol imports [for non-Muslims] by 100%). Additionally, 
46 countries used an ad valorem alcohol taxation system only, 24 used a specific taxation 
system only, five used a unitary taxation system only, and 63 used two or more taxation 
systems. Of these 63 countries, 38 did not provide information on the alcohol taxation 
methods used, whereas 25 indicated that alcohol taxation systems were used in 
combination. For the countries that used two or more alcohol taxation systems but did 
not indicate if they were used in combination, six used both specific and ad valorem 
taxation, two used both specific and unitary taxation, 26 used both ad valorem and unitary 
taxation, and four used specific, ad valorem and unitary taxation. It is important to note 
that the categories of ad valorem taxation, specific taxation and unitary taxation may 
not fit in countries that have complex taxation systems, such as in Mexico, which applies 
ad valorem taxation but where the tax rate differs for different alcoholic beverages and 
where alcoholic beverage categories are based on alcohol content. For the countries that 
used two or more alcohol taxation systems and did not indicate if they were used in 
combination, 13 countries calculated the tax due on an alcoholic beverage as the sum of 
two or more alcohol taxation systems (seven countries summed specific and ad valorem 
taxation, one country summed specific and unitary taxation, one country summed ad 
valorem and unitary taxation, and four countries summed taxation methods but did not 
provide data on which taxation methods they summed). Seven countries calculated the 
tax due on an alcoholic beverage as the higher of two or more alcohol taxation systems 
(five countries used an ad valorem taxation system with a specific floor, one country used 
an ad valorem taxation system with a unitary floor, and one country used a specific taxation 
system with a unitary floor).
 Overall, 74 countries used ad valorem taxation (13 based ad valorem taxation on 
retail price alone, 43 countries based ad valorem taxation on producer price, five countries 
based ad valorem taxation on both producer and retail price, and 13 countries implemented 
ad valorem taxation but did not indicate the price on which the tax was based), 75 used 
specific taxation, and 42 used unitary taxation.
Problems related to unrecorded alcohol consumption and alcohol taxation
 Unrecorded consumption presents two problems with respect to taxation. First, 
unrecorded consumption lessens the effects of taxation increases on alcohol consumption. 
The increases in the price of recorded alcohol can lead, theoretically, to the substitution 
of recorded alcohol by unrecorded alcohol, and increases in the price of recorded alcohol 
do not directly affect the price of unrecorded alcohol. Second, excise tax is not applied 
to purchases of unrecorded alcohol, resulting in the loss of potential taxation revenues.
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Summary of chapter 3.2
 
 Alcohol taxation methods vary globally. Many countries – and within these countries 
the provinces, regions and states – adopt different approaches to the taxation of alcoholic 
beverages. The 2012 GSAH found that 11 countries did not tax beer, 28 countries did not 
tax wine, and 15 countries did not tax spirits; many of these countries do not tax alcohol 
for historical reasons. Additionally, the excise taxation methods vary considerably by 
country and, in a number of cases, within countries. Thus, there is a need to determine 
which taxation methods are the most effective considering the variety of circumstances 
that exist among and within individual countries.
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 The fourth section addresses the implementation of taxation and pricing policies, 
and provides strategies to facilitate effective and efficient tax administration.
 This section has four chapters. Chapter 4.1 addresses general implementation 
issues, which include tax administration, the substitution effect, affordability, tax rate 
determination, symmetry of price elasticity, tax avoidance and tax evasion, protection of 
domestic brands, alcohol taxation and the poor, and taxation and stockpiling. Chapter 4.2 
focuses on the effect of unrecorded alcohol on taxation. Chapter 4.3 discusses specific 
issues that relate to alcohol taxation and pricing policies, which include trade agreement 
practices, the general economy, and other alcohol control policies. Chapter 4.4 discusses 
earmarked taxation.
Chapter 4.1
General implementation issues of alcohol taxation and pricing policies 
Bundit Sornpaisarn, Esa Österberg
 This chapter addresses the general implementation of taxation and pricing policies 
– including tax administration, the substitution effect, affordability and tax rate 
determination, symmetry of price elasticity, tax avoidance and tax evasion, protection of 
domestic brands, alcohol taxation and the poor, and taxation and stockpiling. Because 
there is limited literature on alcohol tax administration, this chapter mainly comprises 
lessons learned from the taxation of tobacco which are documented in the WHO technical 
manual on tobacco tax administration (WHO, 2010b).
Tax administration
 The implementation of taxation and pricing policies presupposes an administrative 
structure for setting and collecting taxes, and at least some knowledge of the alcohol 
market in the jurisdiction where the policies are to be implemented. Taxes on alcoholic 
beverages can be collected when alcoholic beverages are imported to the country, when 
they are released for distribution and consumption from domestic production centres or 
tax-free storage, or when they are sold to consumers from on-premise or off-premise 
retail establishments. Alcohol excise duties are typically collected by customs and excise 
officers from importers and producers at the point at which products enter the wholesale 
or retail market. Tax collection requires some form of registration or licensing of all alcohol 
importers and producers or places of alcohol manufacture. In the WHO’s “Global strategy 
to reduce the harmful use of alcohol” (2010), the recommendation for regulatory 
mechanisms with respect to production, importation and wholesaling of alcohol is to 
facilitate taxation procedures, although regulation at this level can also have health and 
safety purposes. Uncontrolled or unsafe distillation methods, for instance, can accidentally 
produce highly poisonous methanol rather than ethanol.
Section 4:
Implementation issues concerning
taxation and pricing policies
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 The cost-effectiveness of alcohol taxes as a public health strategy in countries is 
partly based on customs and excise systems that existed before the introduction of specific 
customs duties or excise taxes on alcoholic beverages. The existing administrative systems 
for tax collection should, therefore, be already in place. Regulation, reporting and collecting 
of tax from importers and local producers involve fewer points of collection and enforcement 
than, for instance, sales tax. Consequently, knowledge is required of the quantity of 
alcoholic beverages consumed and of how this consumption is spread across different 
alcoholic beverage categories such as beer, cider, wine, fortified wine, alcopops or 
RTD-products, distilled beverages, or other locally important beverages. For the estimation 
of new alcohol tax decisions, knowledge of total alcohol consumption based on recorded 
on- and off-premise alcohol sales and on unrecorded alcohol consumption is also valuable. 
To ensure exact planning of alcohol taxation, studies on price elasticities and drinking 
habits can be conducted.
 Tax administration should be effective and efficient (WHO, 2010b). Effective tax 
administration requires a high level of compliance by taxpayers, whereas efficient tax 
administration requires low administrative costs in relation to revenue collected. Effective 
and efficient tax administration requires technical capacity by the administrative agency 
and a well-designed tax system. A well-designed excise tax policy exhibits transparency 
and is easily defined; increased efficiency can be achieved by reducing administrative 
costs.
 A precursor for a well-designed tax system is a simple and unified excise taxation 
system within which all alcohol products are taxed at the same level. The system should 
possess the ability to generate tax revenue, decrease alcohol consumption and its related 
harms, and prevent initiation of alcohol drinking. As analysed in Section 3, specific taxation 
may be appropriate for high-income countries with a high prevalence of current drinkers; 
combination methods, including mixed specific and ad valorem taxation and ad valorem 
with specific floor taxation, may be appropriate for LMICs with a high prevalence of lifetime 
abstainers, whereas a minimum pricing policy may be employed if the government requires 
a solution to problems caused by the consumption of cheap alcoholic beverages.
 To choose the best taxation design, the government can do the following. First, 
taxation and pricing policy goals should be set that represent a combination of tax revenue 
generation, reduction of alcohol consumption and its related harms, and prevention of 
alcohol drinking initiation. Second, the taxation method that will achieve the desired goals 
should be selected. Third, the uniform tax rate system, or the smallest number of differential 
alcoholic beverage categories should be determined in case the government decides to 
employ a differential tax rate system. The smaller the number of categories, the less 
complexity in determining the differential tax rate.
 The strength of tax administration comes from the administrators’ ability to monitor 
and enhance tax compliance and ensure greater revenues by reducing opportunities for 
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tax avoidance and tax evasion. Effective tax administration should have strategies and 
structures to ensure that noncompliance with tax law is minimized. Tax authorities may 
implement the following compliance-enhancing procedures:
 Effective administration of excise taxation requires cooperation between taxpayers 
and the tax administration agency. In countries with well-established tax collection systems, 
excise taxes are administered by relying on the taxpayer’s registration, filing and payment 
of tax returns. Tax authorities, in return, execute enforcement actions that aim to ensure 
compliance by verification. The most common enforcement actions are auditing taxpayers’ 
accounts periodically and taking costly measures to combat illicit activities and ensure 
higher revenues. These measures include conducting physical controls and using various 
tax stamps.
 The implementation of physical controls in countries with poor administration 
systems, “enforced compliance”. is typically executed by imposing physical controls over 
the production and manufacturing process. The costs of physical control increase when 
the potential for fraud by excise officers is considered. However, fraud is reduced 
considerably when excise officers are rotated frequently among different locations and 
when supervisors conduct supervision visits.
 Based on lessons learned from the WHO technical manual on tobacco tax 
administration (WHO, 2010b), tax stamps include traditional tax stamps, enhanced tax 
stamps (banderoles), and digital tax stamps. Traditional tax stamps are required by many 
countries and ensure taxpayer compliance by monitoring production and distinguishing 
licit products from illicit ones. Products that do not hold tax stamps are considered to 
have been produced illegally or smuggled. Enhanced tax stamps (banderoles) represent 
a new tax stamp technology that is used to reduce the risk of counterfeit tax stamps, 
monitor domestic producers more efficiently, and increase the flow of information. The 
system requires manufacturers’ compliance because monitoring scanners are placed at 
production facilities. Monitoring scanners read the tax stamps and electronically transfer 
the information to the finance ministry. Consequently, the tax administration agency 
receives live information concerning the number of products produced by the manufacturer, 
the brands, when the products were produced and by which factories, and other useful 
information for tracking, tracing and enforcement. The system enables the tax 
administrators to verify manufacturer compliance. Digital tax stamps provide an effective 
tracking and tracing system to reduce tax evasion. They carry information concerning the 
brand and manufacturers’ name, the facility where the products were produced, and the 
time the stamp was produced and purchased. The product can thus be traced back to its 
Request producers, importers and exporters to register for tax purposes and obtain a 
licence for production, distribution and retail sales.
Monitor domestic production and trade activities by conducting physical controls and 
requiring tax stamps on alcohol products.
Require taxpayers, including manufacturers and importers, to file tax returns and pay 
tax liability within a specific period of time after the alcohol products move from the 
factories or enter the country.
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source. Banderoles and digital tax stamps differ in that the finance ministry obtains the 
necessary information live from the banderole system, whereas the digital system requires 
distributors to place an order via a secure connection to a designated government authority. 
After the authority verifies and approves the order, the distributor fulfils the order by 
delivering encrypted codes and authorizes digital stamps. However, it is not clear how 
the authority verifies the order. For instance, the cigarette distributor prints the digital 
stamps, and the cigarettes are then shipped to retail outlets.
Substitution effects
 Three recent meta-analyses showed that beer possessed a lower own-price 
elasticity value than wine or distilled spirits. An explanation for the low absolute value of 
own-price elasticity of beer could be that beer is a common beverage consumed daily 
during leisure activities or with meals in the countries from which these meta-analyses 
originate. In these countries, beer is considered almost a necessary commodity among 
beer-drinkers. In other countries, beer is a luxury item with higher price elasticity (Edwards 
et al., 1994; Sornpaisarn et al., 2012a). This point is better highlighted by wine which, in 
the three meta-analyses, had a higher absolute value for own-price elasticity than beer. 
However, a study of price elasticities in countries where wine is an ordinary beverage 
consumed with meals shows wine to be price-inelastic (Edwards et al., 1994). A low 
absolute value of price elasticity for wine indicates that the studied wine drinkers 
identify the beverage as a necessity, similar to an ordinary foodstuff. Only a few decades 
ago, in the Nordic countries, wine was considered a rare luxury commodity consumed 
mostly during festive occasions. In Sweden at that time, wine had an own-price elasticity 
of -1.6 (Sundström & Ekström 1962). Even in later years, the value of own-price elasticity 
for wine was -1.5 in Norway and -1.3 in Finland (Horverak 1979; Salo 1990). In the latest 
Finnish study on price elasticities, the own-price elasticity value for wine was -1.4, indicating 
that, in Finland, wine is not a common beverage consumed with meals, but a beverage 
consumed in other social situations (Vihmo, 2006).
 As Wagenaar and his colleagues emphasize, price elasticity values are not inherent 
properties of alcoholic beverages (Wagenaar et al., 2009, see also Bruun et al., 1975). As 
different uses of alcoholic beverages are reflected in price elasticity values, the substitution 
between different alcoholic beverages and other commodities depends on the uses of 
alcoholic beverages (Bruun et al., 1975). For instance, in a country where wine is used as 
a beverage with meals, an increase in wine prices could increase the consumption of 
bottled water, but it would be unlikely to increase the use of home distilled spirits or illicit 
drugs. In countries where wine is mostly used as an intoxicant, increases in wine prices 
are more likely to lead to an increase in the consumption of distilled spirits or moonshine, 
or even illicit drugs, rather than bottled water or milk. 
 Based on the above explanation and on other details of the limitations of taxation 
and pricing policies set out in Section 1, the government should consider a possible 
substitution effect when implementing taxation and pricing policies, particularly in cases 
where the differential tax rate policy is employed.
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Affordability and tax rate determination
 The term “alcohol affordability” is now prevalent. It refers to people’ s ability to 
buy and consume alcohol and is a function of alcohol price and consumers’ income 
(Rabinovich et al., 2009). According to Rabinovich and colleagues, the affordability of 
alcohol increased between 1996 and 2004 in almost all EU Member States. The authors’ 
analysis also indicated that, across the EU, 84% of the increase in alcohol affordability in 
the period of 1996-2004 was driven by increases in income, and only 16% was driven by 
changes in alcohol prices (Rabinovich et al., 2009). Although incomes have increased 
considerably across EU countries, the relative prices of alcoholic beverages have remained 
stable or decreased (Rabinovich et al., 2009). A meta-analysis that included 132 studies 
with 1014 income elasticity estimates found a positive relationship between income and 
alcohol consumption, with an estimated median short-run elasticity of 0.676 and an 
estimated median long-run elasticity of 0.860 (Gallet, 2007). The increase in affordability 
is associated with an increase in alcohol consumption in the EU, with an estimated short-run 
and long-run income elasticity of demand of 0.22 and 0.32, respectively (Rabinovich et 
al., 2009).
 Alcohol prices have been decreasing in many countries in recent decades because 
of changing industry cost structures and also because many governments have allowed 
alcohol excise duty and its effect on prices to be eroded by inflation in the cost of living. 
It is significant, therefore, that countries have alcohol tax legislation that permits ready 
adjustment of tax rates for various alcohol products on an annual basis and that allows 
rates to be adjusted for inflation – particularly in cases of specific taxation and unitary 
taxation. The effective price of alcohol to the consumer can also be affected by changes 
in income levels within a country. In times of increasing incomes, excise tax levels may 
also require regular adjustment to ensure that alcohol does not become more affordable 
(Rabinovich et al., 2009). A review of alcohol affordability is a reminder that increases in 
alcohol prices alone are not sufficient to reduce alcohol consumption if other factors 
affecting alcohol demand have a conflicting effect.
 The effect of affordability on alcohol consumption may be greater for developing 
countries than for developed ones. A study that compared income elasticity of alcohol 
consumption in 19 developing countries with the income elasticity of alcohol consumption 
in 24 developed countries found that the average income elasticity of alcohol consumption 
was 1.1 for developing countries compared to an average income elasticity of alcohol 
consumption of 0.8 for developed countries (Selvanathan & Selvanathan, 2005). 
 A strong association between affordability (measured by alcohol price and income), 
alcohol consumption (Gallet 2007; Rabinovich et al., 2009), and alcohol-related harms 
(Babor et al., 2010) implies that effective alcohol taxation and pricing policies should 
consider the affordability of alcohol and how the affordability of alcohol may change, 
particularly in LMICs.
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The symmetry of price elasticities
 It has been argued that the addictive nature of alcohol implies that the price 
elasticity of alcoholic beverages may not be symmetrical (Bruun et al., 1975). A decrease 
in alcohol prices may have a greater increasing impact on alcohol consumption than the 
same magnitude of a price increase realized after a decrease in alcohol consumption. 
Another reason for asymmetrical price elasticities could be that alcoholic beverages are 
now so accessible in many industrialized countries that a further increase in alcohol 
availability will not increase alcohol consumption because the market is already saturated 
(Room et al., 2009).
 Saturation can be used as one explanation for the results of the Nordic alcohol 
tax study. This study included Denmark, Finland and Sweden which were all obliged to 
abolish the quantitative quotas for travellers’ duty-free alcohol imports for private use at 
the beginning of 2004. To combat increases in travellers’ alcohol imports, the alcohol 
excise duty rates for distilled spirits were decreased in Denmark in October 2003. In 
Finland, the excise duty rates were decreased for all alcoholic beverages in May 2004 
(Mäkelä & Österberg, 2009). In Denmark, neither the alcohol sales statistics nor the 
survey data found an increase in total alcohol consumption, and there were no clear 
increases in mortality or morbidity. The survey data were similar in southern Sweden 
where an increase in travellers’ alcohol imports from Denmark was expected. Only Finland 
experienced an increase in alcohol consumption, with evidence of both increases in alcohol 
consumption and in related harms being found.
Tax avoidance and tax evasion
 One challenge for tax administrators is maintaining a tax revenue base and flow, 
particularly after a tax increase. Tax avoidance and tax evasion can reduce tax revenue 
and undermine or decrease the health impact of increasing alcohol taxation. Tax avoidance 
is legal as it is a change in economic or other activity for the purpose of reducing tax 
payment, whereas tax evasion involves illegal activities for the purpose of avoiding tax 
payment.
 Tax avoidance is performed by both consumers and producers (WHO, 2010b). Tax 
avoidance by consumers involves legal activities, such as the purchase of goods for personal 
consumption from duty-free shops or lower tax jurisdictions and transporting them across 
borders under an allowance quota. Tax avoidance by producers is more complex, and is 
largely unexplored in the literature, even with respect to tobacco. Tax avoidance involves 
legal activities, such as manipulating the characteristics of the product (such as the alcohol 
concentration of the beverages, the mixture of the beverages, or the packaging) and a 
pricing policy that reduces the tax burden on the products. For example, Thailand’ s largest 
alcohol company increased its production of the least-taxed alcoholic beverage type and 
decreased its production of the most-taxed alcoholic beverage type during 2005-2009 
(Sornpaisarn & Kaewmungkun, 2010). There is also evidence of a production shift toward 
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the least-taxed alcoholic beverage in each tax tier in New Zealand (New Zealand Law 
Commission, 2010). Opportunities for tax avoidance tend to increase if the tax structure 
is too complex; simplifying the structure of alcohol excise taxation will help reduce these 
opportunities and will facilitate monitoring of the costs per unit of tax revenue raised.
 Tax evasion usually involves taxpayers intentionally misrepresenting or concealing 
their true economic activities from the tax authorities to reduce their tax responsibility 
(WHO, 2010b). For instance, alcohol importers may evade customs duties and domestic 
manufacturers may evade domestic production excise taxes by misdeclaration of the 
quantity or description of the products or by under-invoicing. Under-invoicing will reduce 
the tax base when the duty is ad valorem taxation, whereas misdeclaration of quantity 
is more relevant when the duty is specific taxation.
 Tax evasion, or illicit trade, includes both smuggling and illicit production (WHO, 
2010b). It may involve legitimate or imitation products. Smuggling is the trade of products 
through unauthorized routes. It implies total or substantial evasion of customs duties, 
excise and income taxes. It may be either long-distance, large-scale organized smuggling, 
or cross-border smuggling. Large-scale smuggling happens when large quantities of 
alcohol products are illegally transported, distributed and sold without any tax being paid 
at all, even in the country of origin. During transport, export goods have in-transit status; 
the goods can leave the country of export without being assessed for any taxes or duties. 
In-transit goods are often temporarily stored in countries other than their final 
destinations to await transfer. Large-scale smugglers often divert cargos at this point. 
Smugglers and legal traders may not always be separate groups. Smugglers may be 
distributors disguising their smuggling with legal imports and reducing the costs of their 
legal imports with contraband.
 Illicit production may involve the production of legitimate brands by legal 
manufacturers who declare to the tax authorities only a fraction of their production, or 
illicit production may involve imitation products by illegal domestic manufacturers (WHO, 
2010b).
 High tax increases may provide financial incentives for under-invoicing, 
misdeclaration of the quantity or description of the product, smuggling, and illicit 
production, particularly when tax laws and enforcement are weak, penalties are small, 
and if the prosecution of smugglers takes time. Both tax revenues and consumption are 
impacted by the presence of an illicit market, and the impact is greater if this market is 
substantial (WHO, 2010b).
Protection of domestic brands
 Taxation measures have been used to protect domestic brands of alcohol products 
(Babor et al., 2010). One of the main reasons for the involvement of the government has 
been to provide affordable products to the mass population (WHO, 2010b). Governments 
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impose a differential excise system including the differential excise tax method, or a 
differential excise tax rate levies greater taxes on premium or high-price brands, which 
are often produced by foreign manufacturers, than tax rates on lower-grade, lower-priced 
brands that are often produced domestically. For instance, Australia applies the specific 
tax method for all alcoholic beverages other than wine, whereas the country applies the 
ad valorem tax method to wine to protect the low-price wine industry in the country 
(Doran et al., 2013); the Republic of Korea employs lower tax rates for Soju, the popular 
domestic beverages, than for other beverages (Chung, 2004); and Thailand increases tax 
rates greater and faster for expensive brands, which are usually imported, than for cheap 
brands which are usually produced domestically (Sornpaisarn & Kaewmungkun, 2014). 
Consequently, as the tax gap increases, consumers switch to lower-tax products, resulting 
in a less effective taxation policy for the control of alcohol-related problems.
Alcohol taxation and the poor
 Progressivity is an economic term used to describe the distribution of tax burdens 
(or tax incidences) across the population (Kesselman & Cheung, 2004). Excise taxation 
on (luxury) goods and services, with an income elasticity of demand greater than one, has 
been justified as an instrument for improving the progressivity of the tax system (Cnossen, 
2010). A progressive tax is a tax that attempts to reduce the tax incidence of poor people 
as it shifts the incidence to wealthier individuals, whereas a regressive tax works in the 
reverse manner (Kesselman & Cheung, 2004). Specific taxation is considered a regressive 
tax because the wealthy and the poor pay the same amount of excise tax under specific 
taxation if they consume a cheap or expensive alcoholic beverage with similar alcohol 
content (Smith, 2005). This implies that the poor pay tax at a greater proportion of income 
than do the rich. Conversely, ad valorem taxation is considered a progressive tax because 
the wealthy pay more excise tax if they consume more expensive alcoholic beverages 
compared to the preferences of the poor (Smith, 2005). Combination taxes have both 
regressive and progressive attributes (Sornpaisarn & Kaewmungkun, 2014). Combination 
tax methods are considered regressive because their specific taxation component is more 
effective on inexpensive beverages, resulting in a higher tax burden on the poor. 
Combination tax methods are still considered progressive because their ad valorem 
component is more effective on expensive beverages that impose a greater tax burden 
on the rich. There is no literature that explains clearly the progressivity attribute of unitary 
taxation. With respect to progressivity, the government must consider the effect of a 
taxation method on tax incidence distribution across the population of alcohol consumers.
Taxation and stockpiling
 When manufacturers, wholesalers or retailers anticipate a tax increase, they may 
stockpile alcoholic beverages of the current, lower tax level (WHO, 2010b). Thailand is an 
example of a country exhibiting potential stockpiling before taxation increases (Sornpaisarn 
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& Kaewmungkun, 2014). Seven alcohol excise tax increases occurred between 1997 and 
2009. Alcohol producers typically produce their products according to their sale capacity 
in order to manage stock warehouses effectively. With respect to the seven alcohol tax 
increases, however, there were three incidences of potentially overstocked production 
one year prior to the taxation increases during the same period. One large alcohol 
company had potentially stocked all tax-affected products before the taxes increased, 
resulting in the ability to obtain the prior lower tax rates. Revealing intended alcohol 
taxation increases thus reduces the effectiveness of taxation policy; hence, governments 
should not disclose their intention to increase alcohol taxation.
Summary of chapter 4.1
 To advocate for alcohol taxation and pricing policies, public health personnel and 
non-economist alcohol control policy advocates must understand the factors relating to 
the implementation of taxation and pricing policies. Alcohol excise duties are typically 
collected by customs and excise officers from importers and producers at the point at 
which products are about to enter the wholesale or retail markets. Collection requires 
some form of registration or licensing of all alcohol importers, producers, or places of 
alcohol manufacture and wholesalers.
 Tax administration should be effective and efficient. The effectiveness of tax 
administration depends on high levels of compliance from taxpayers, whereas the 
efficiency of tax administration depends on low administrative costs in relation to revenue 
collected. Effective and efficient tax administration requires a well-designed tax system 
and significant technical capacity in the administrative agency. A well-designed excise tax 
policy is transparent and easily defined, increasing efficiency by reducing administrative 
costs.
 Effective administration of excise taxation requires cooperation between taxpayers 
and the tax administration agency. In countries with well-established tax collection systems, 
excise taxes are administered by relying on the taxpayer’s registration, filing, and payment 
of tax returns. Tax authorities, in return, execute enforcement actions to ensure compliance 
by verification. In general, in countries with poor administration systems, “enforced 
compliance” imposes physical control over the production and manufacturing processes 
and applies various types of available tax stamps.
 The government should consider substitution consumption among various alcoholic 
beverage categories which may result from taxation and pricing policies. The government 
should increase tax rates regularly by taking account of inflation and the income of the 
population to ensure effective taxation and pricing policies that keep pace with 
developments in affordability.
 The government must prevent or combat tax avoidance and tax evasion to 
implement taxation and pricing policies effectively. Tax avoidance is legal; it is a change 
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in economic or other activity to reduce tax payment, whereas tax evasion involves illegal 
activities to avoid tax payment.
 The government sometimes modifies taxation and pricing policies to protect sales 
of domestic alcohol products. Public health personnel and policy advocates should be 
aware of this situation because, as the tax gap increases, consumers switch to lower-tax 
products, resulting in a taxation policy that is less effective in controlling alcohol-related 
problems. Moreover, when manufacturers, wholesalers or retailers expect a tax increase, 
they may stockpile alcoholic beverages of the current, lower tax level. Consequently, the 
government must not reveal its intention to increase alcohol taxation.
 Lastly, the effective designing and implementation of taxation and pricing policies 
requires government knowledge of market shares between alcoholic beverage categories, 
on- and off-premise alcohol sales, recorded and unrecorded alcohol consumption, 
substitution within and between alcoholic beverage categories, and own-price and 
cross-price elasticity of various alcoholic beverages. This information is usually not available; 
however, the government can employ taxation and pricing policies with the information 
that is available.
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Chapter 4.2
The effect of unrecorded consumption on taxation
Jürgen Rehm
 Unrecorded consumption is a summary term for all alcohol that is not recorded in 
the country where it is consumed (Rehm et al., 2014). The WHO’ s 2011 Global Status 
Report on Alcohol and Health (WHO, 2011) found that for 2004, globally, 28.7% of all 
alcohol was unrecorded, with a clear gradient from low-income countries (47.9%) to 
lower-middle-income ones (38.9%), and from upper-middle-income countries (30.5%) to 
high-income ones (11.2%). Fig. 4.1 provides an overview of the various categories of 
unrecorded alcohol consumption (Lachenmeier et al., 2013), which is also helpful in devising 
alcohol policy measures to reduce unrecorded consumption, as recommended by the 
“Global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol” (WHO, 2010). This chapter will 
consider the different forms of unrecorded consumption and the impact on taxation. 
 Cross-border shopping as a form of unrecorded consumption is a challenge for 
taxation, mainly for smaller countries or countries with longer borders which have 
established a taxation structure resulting in overall higher prices compared to 
neighbouring countries. The Nordic countries are an example of the potential effect of 
cross-border shopping subsequent to their joining the EU, at which point the existing 
restrictions on travel allowances were not considered compatible with EU rules (Nordlund 
& Österberg, 2000). Consequently, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden lowered their taxes to 
Source: Reproduced by permission by the publisher from Rehm et al., 2014.
Alcohol products 
recorded, but not in 
the jurisdiction 
where they are 
consumed
Cross-border 
shopping
Homemade fruit 
and other spirits; 
homebrewed beer; 
wine products for 
home consumption
Recorded alcohol
Alcohol products
Legal but 
unrecorded 
alcohol products
Surrogate alcohol; 
non-beverage 
alcohol not 
officially intended 
for human 
consumption
Mouthwash, 
perfumes, dena-
tured alcohol, 
automobile 
products, medicinal 
compounds
Moonshine; 
homemade beer, 
wine and spirits 
production in 
countries where it 
is illegal
Unrecorded alcohol 
(about 30% of 
consumption 
globally)
Illegal homemade 
artisanal 
production
Illegal production 
and smuggling 
on a commercial 
(industrial) scale
Mainly spirits; 
but also beer/
wine not taxed
Fig. 4.1. Unrecorded alcohol types and examples, based on Lachenmeier et al., 2013
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avoid losing revenue to increased importation of alcohol from neighbouring countries. In 
Finland, the lowering of taxation was associated with an increase in alcohol-attributable 
mortality, and the one time average decrease in taxation of 33% was subsequently reversed 
by four subsequent increases of approximately 10%, which led to a decrease in 
alcohol-attributable mortality (National Institute for Health and Welfare, 2012). Cross-border 
shopping can affect national taxation objectives for alcohol in countries that border those 
with a lower alcohol pricing structure. The effect decreases with distance to the border 
(e.g. Bygvrå, 2009; Grittner & Bloomfield, 2009), and cross-border shopping is the only 
unrecorded consumption that mainly affects middle-income and high-income earners 
(Svensson, 2009).
 Cross-border drinking is source of unrecorded alcohol consumption. For example, 
there may be price differences for alcohol between the United States and Mexico and 
between the United States and Canada, as well as different legal systems which allow 
young adults to drink in Mexico and/or Canada although they are not old enough to meet 
the minimum legal age requirements for drinking in the United States (Clapp et al., 2001; 
Room & West, 1998). Indeed, this situation led to extensive cross-border drinking among 
students of two southwestern United States universities in Mexican bars and pubs close 
to the border (Clapp et al., 2001). However, given the size of the United States, the overall 
impact of this phenomenon on average per capita consumption or alcohol-attributable 
harm is small (for an overview of alcohol-attributable harm, see Shield et al., 2013b).
 Although the effect of cross-border shopping on alcohol consumption and 
alcohol-attributable harm exists, its overall impact on global public health is not as large 
as has been suggested. Even in smaller countries, or countries that have long borders 
with neighbouring countries with cheaper alcohol, the impact is limited – i.e. not exceeding 
30% of all alcohol consumed. The lowering of taxation as a reaction to price differences 
between countries is problematic from a public health perspective because it may increase 
overall alcohol consumption and decrease revenues. However, limiting cross-border 
shopping by limiting travel allowances supports alcohol policies, including taxation, and 
could be justified by the negative impact of alcohol on public health (Lim et al., 2012; Rehm 
et al., 2009).
 With respect to other forms of unrecorded consumption, the development of the 
unrecorded market as a function of taxation changes should be addressed. Many pleas 
for taxation increases, particularly in LMICs, have been challenged because of evidence 
pointing to resulting increases in unrecorded consumption. However, actual evidence of 
taxation increases leading to substantial increases in unrecorded consumption is scarce 
(see Room et al., 2002 for the example of Zambia), whereas a recent review of taxation 
increases found parallel decreases of consumption in LMICs (Sornpaisarn et al., 2013), 
even though unrecorded consumption was not always subject to controls. The only study 
to date of the effects of taxation increases on harm indicators in LMICs found a strong 
association between taxation increases and a reduction in motor vehicle accidents 
(Sornpaisarn et al., 2016). Unrecorded alcohol consumption constitutes a sizable portion 
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of overall alcohol consumption and should, therefore, be reduced or controlled as part of 
a national alcohol policy that integrates different measures, including taxation (WHO, 
2010). The greater the control of unrecorded alcohol, the more effective taxation measures 
will be. The following measures can be used to reduce unrecorded consumption (Lachenmeier 
et al., 2011; see also Lachenmeier, 2009):
The prohibition of toxic compounds used to denature alcohol (e.g. methanol) can improve 
health outcomes associated with surrogate alcohol consumption (Lachenmeier et al., 
2007).
The implementation of actions limiting illegal trade and counterfeiting include the 
introduction of tax stamps, electronic surveillance systems of the alcohol trade, and 
increased enforcement (Lachenmeier et al., 2011).
The most problematic category appears to be home and small-scale artisanal production, 
for which the most promising option may be to offer financial incentives to the producers 
for registration and quality control. For instance, the government could establish 
a monopoly to buy unrecorded liquor at market prices and initiate quality control, as the 
German government did following World War I, to limit unrecorded consumption 
(Lachenmeier & Rehm, 2010). Such a measure may be too expensive for LMICs today, 
but for some Eastern European countries it may be a cost-effective measure. Alternatively, 
a market process that increases recorded product share by offering cheaper recorded 
products with a more traditional content (e.g. maize beer in Africa) might prove effective 
(see Willis, 2003 for the example of Kenya). Recent globalization and economic growth 
have seen a decrease in traditional beverages and an increase in beer and other globalized 
beverages when the GDP-PPP increases (see the changes concerning pulque versus 
industrial beer in Mexico (Medina-Mora et al., 2000)). It remains to be seen whether 
these measures will lead to reduced consumption globally of unrecorded products.
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Chapter 4.3
Special issues concerning the implementation of alcohol taxation and pricing 
policies
Peter Anderson, Ben Baumberg 
 This chapter discusses the potential impact of trade agreements on alcohol pricing 
policies, and the potential impact of pricing policies on employment in the alcohol production 
and retail sectors. There is no doubt that trade agreements have an impact on the freedom 
to implement alcohol policies; however, this should not cause policy-makers to avoid 
considering policies that are entirely legitimate under the current trading system. 
Policy-makers, in general, are free to adopt policies on alcohol provided they are not more 
trade restrictive than necessary to protect health and are non-discriminatory. Although 
alcohol pricing policies may lead to some adjustment costs in the short term, most 
economists would expect the effect on employment to be effectively zero in the long 
term. 
Alcohol pricing policies and trade agreements2
 International trade law is a generic term for the legal provisions that cover varying 
geographical and subject areas. The most high-profile global agreement for many years 
was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) on goods, which was agreed 
by 23 countries and was progressively revised and expanded to incorporate over 100 
countries by the 1970s. In 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) was created, and 
the WTO Agreement incorporated a number of agreements. These include the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which is relevant to some alcohol policies affecting 
retail or distribution services and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which is 
relevant to some labelling regulations. These are the agreements that are most relevant 
to alcohol policies (Baumberg & Anderson, 2008a; Ziegler, 2009), and policies at the 
regional level such as the policies of the EU (Baumberg & Anderson, 2008b). However, 
the obligations in the WTO framework may be added to by free trade agreements or 
customs unions – i.e. additional trade agreements between two countries – as has been 
suggested in the case of tobacco (Fooks & Gilmore, 2013).
 There are two parts to the WTO system. First, there is the law itself: a set of 
agreements that all Members agree to adhere to, although there are some areas where 
Members can either opt in or opt out of commitments. Second, the enforcement of the 
law follows a process whereby: 1) a Member makes a request for consultations with the 
Member implementing the measure in question 2) failing resolution through negotiations, 
the complainant requests establishment of a WTO panel to judge the case, if necessary 
with the help of scientific/technical experts; and 3) if the panel report is appealed, the 
appeal is adjudicated by the Appellate Body (AB). Finally, the Dispute Settlement Body 
adopts the Panel or AB report.
2  This part mainly summarizes the longer discussion in Baumberg & Anderson, 2008a. The more recent 
United States Clove Cigarettes case supports the analysis in that paper; for details on this case, see 
Jarman, 2012 and von Tigerstrom, 2013.
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 The WTO agreements prohibit alcohol and other policies that inadvertently 
discriminate in favour of domestic goods or services over foreign goods or services. Yet 
both GATT (Article XX) and GATS (Article XIV) explicitly state that nothing in either 
agreement “shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures . . . necessary to protect . . . human health.” This applies as long as 
such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a “disguised restriction 
on trade” or “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.” Although this health exception 
allows WTO Members to implement alcohol policies that would otherwise violate 
international trade commitments, the crucial word here is “necessary.” The necessity test 
requires, among other things, that “the measure be the least trade-restrictive measure 
reasonably available in the circumstances to meet the objective of protecting health” 
(Fidler et al., 2005).
Protectionist policies
 As a general rule, policies that protect domestic alcohol industries from foreign 
competition are unlikely to be permissible under WTO law (Shaffer et al., 2005). This is 
reflected in the laws struck down in a series of pre-WTO disputes between Canada and 
the United States (Ferris et al., 1993; Vingils et al., 1998; Room & West, 1998) and later 
disputes giving locally-produced drinks favourable tax treatment in Chile, Japan, and 
Korea (Ziegler, 2006). However, tariffs charged on the import of foreign drinks are 
permissible up to bound levels agreed by each Member under the GATT 1947, but are also 
likely to be scrapped where Members have made commitments, such as under free trade 
agreements or customs unions. The removal of such policies is likely to increase alcohol 
consumption by a combination of reduced price (through comparative advantage and 
productivity improvements) and increased marketing (Gould & Schacter, 2002).  
Health policies
 In contrast, effective health policies are likely to be consistent with WTO law. This 
is with the caveat that policies will still be subject to a necessity test, which certain highly 
trade-restrictive policies are unlikely to pass. For example, banning imports (but permitting 
domestic production) is also unlikely to be lawful, as was illustrated by the 1990 Thai 
cigarettes case, where a GATT (1947) Panel ruled that there were equally effective but 
less trade-restrictive measures available, such as tax increases and an advertising ban 
(Baumberg & Anderson, 2008a). However, Members are entirely free to set their own 
level of health protection (Bloche & Jungman, 2003), and a purely health-motivated policy 
would be upheld in the WTO courts. Members can also follow minority reasonable scientific 
opinion (Saspin et al., 2003) when assessing risks (Bloche & Jungman, 2003). 
 Trade policies are likely to increase alcohol-related harm by their effect on fully 
or partly protectionist policies. However, Members may regulate purely on health grounds 
(Grieshaber-Otto et al., 2000; Ziegler, 2006). Yet there are signs that the belief among 
the public health community is that a greater number of health-motivated policies may 
not be permissible under WTO law (Baumberg & Anderson, 2008a). Uncertainty over trade 
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treaties - and the exaggerated claims made about them by companies - could “chill” 
domestic policy-making initiatives and lead policy-makers to avoid considering policies 
that are entirely legitimate under the current trading system. To avoid this, it is necessary 
to send a clear message to policy-makers that, in general, they are free to adopt nearly 
any health policy on alcohol as long as it is non-discriminatory and not more trade restrictive 
than necessary. 
 For existing policies that are compromises between health and protectionist 
interests, policy-makers can wait to see if they are challenged at the WTO and, if they 
are, the policies can be redesigned on health grounds rather than abolishing them 
completely. Any perceptions to the contrary may be needlessly damaging to public health. 
Whatever the views on these options, governments can act within the current system to 
minimize possible trade effects on alcohol-related harm. First, they can avoid making any 
further commitments related to alcohol in the future, thus allowing themselves to pursue 
health-focused policies. This also allows them to avoid the negative effects of liberalization 
per se, and to pursue the purely health-focused policies mentioned above. Second, to the 
extent that this is politically feasible and desirable, policy-makers can introduce stringent 
alcohol policies to counteract the effect of liberalization that is taking place. Finally, they 
can ensure – and be shown to ensure – that their alcohol policies attempt to achieve their 
health and social welfare goals with the minimum possible impact on trade to render the 
likelihood of breaching WTO law as remote as possible (Baumberg & Anderson, 2008a).
Alcohol pricing policies and the economy
Alcohol sector and GDP
 Few global statistics are available for levels of employment or the contribution to 
GDP associated with alcoholic drinks production, although scattered figures are available 
for individual countries. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
figures from the late 1990s showed that the alcohol industry generated 3% of total 
manufacturing value added in Argentina and the Netherlands, yet only 0.07% in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran; the figures also suggested that the growth rate was much higher in 
low-income countries (5.3%) compared to high-income ones (1.3%) (Room & Jernigan, 
2000). The Brewers of Europe estimated that beer production generated €12 billion of 
value added in the EU, which is approximately 0.1% of GDP (Ernst & Young, 2006). The 
RAND Corporation’s economic impact assessment for the European Commission has further 
extended this to wine and, more speculatively, spirits (Horlings & Scoggins, 2006), finding 
that the combination of the two produce a similar contribution to EU GDP as beer (€9 
billion for wine, €4 billion for spirits) and providing over 0.2% of GDP in total. 
The alcohol sector and jobs
 Another way of expressing this economic contribution is to count the number of 
jobs in alcohol production. Using the same EU example and sources as before, 164,000 
people were estimated to work in brewing, 50,000 in distilleries, and 385,000 in the 
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labour-intensive process of wine production (including agriculture; see below), which is 
roughly 13% of employment in the food industry and 0.3% of total EU employment. If 
productivity is assumed to be constant within and outside the EU – a highly debatable 
assumption, (see below) – this would suggest that around 600,000 people work in beer 
production and wine production worldwide, and a further 300,000 work in spirits 
production, amounting to a total of 1.5 million people.3 
 However, there are various reasons to be cautious about this total, particularly 
because it represents the total number of employees rather than full-time equivalent 
employees (FTEs), which is particularly important for seasonal employment in wine 
production. Previous research for the World Bank suggested that numbers reported to 
be employed by the tobacco industry were three times the actual number of FTEs (Jacobs 
et al., 2000). The level of FTE employment in alcoholic drinks production is unknown. The 
gap between FTEs and the number at least partly employed in drinks production becomes 
significant when we consider small-scale production in low-income countries (LICs). For 
example, an estimate from the 1980s suggests that at least 20-30% of rural households 
in Botswana regularly brew traditional beers, and 90% of these are produced for sale 
(Kortteinen, 1989, cited in Room & Jernigan, 2000). Certain estimates from Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia in the early 1980s have suggested that, in areas 
where traditional beers are produced, 7-20% of the labour force is involved in its production 
or retail (Haggblade, 1987). However, other estimates have been lower at 4-7% (Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania) and 1-2% (distilled palm wine in a village in Benin) (both taken from 
Maula, 1997, cited in Room et al., 2002). This does not mean that all these households 
are fully employed in drinks production; many are likely to use drinks production as a 
supplementary source of income. 
 The discussion so far has focused on value added and employment within particular 
countries; however, alcoholic drinks production is an internationalized industry with complex 
patterns of ownership and licensing. Recent decades have seen the growth of multinational 
drinks producers (da Silva Lopes, 2003) which have partly exploited the associated 
economies of scale in the brewing industry (Karrenbrock, 1990; Muchlinski, 1996). This 
has been true more recently for wine because of technological changes that have made 
global brands and distribution viable (da Silva Lopes, 2003). One estimate suggests that 
10 million cases is the minimum required to support a worldwide network of distributors 
(Jones, 2003). 
Productivity changes in the sector
 Before considering the effect of alcohol pricing policies on employment and value 
added, it should be remembered that the economic success or otherwise of alcoholic 
drinks production – as with all product production – depends on many other factors. Most 
significantly, the productivity of each worker is a key determinant of industry employment, 
3 This shows the EU employment estimates by the share of alcohol production that is estimated to occur 
within the EU, using FAOSTAT data. Note that this omits the production of beverages not included in the 
FAOSTAT figures, with anecdotal evidence suggesting that employment in palm wine production in countries 
such as Gambia could be considerable (Kortteinen, 1989, cited in Room & Jernigan, 2000.)
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in conjunction with the total output level. Limited aggregate data are available, and the 
extent to which developed country productivity figures are replicated elsewhere is difficult 
to estimate. Capital investment is likely to be greater in developed countries and associated 
with higher levels of productivity, particularly for beer and spirits that are now 
capital-intensive in developed countries. One example of the potential productivity gap 
can be seen from the privatization of the ABC Brewery in Ghana, where the number of 
jobs was halved following privatization (Room, 2002). 
 Significantly, without any policy shifts there will be an increase in the productivity 
of drinks-producing workers in all countries. Productivity changes over time are particularly 
relevant for most developing countries, where the insufficiency of previous capital 
investment provides significant opportunity for productivity to be improved (Curry, 1993). 
For instance, a detailed study of the Gwembe district in Zambia (Colson & Scudder, 1988) 
shows the replacement of small-scale, women-owned beer production with larger-scale 
more efficient production in urban areas followed by replacement with imported beer. 
Such effects on female employment in beer production may well be common (Room, 
2002). Similarly, the democratic transition in Chile coincided with a significant growth in 
investment with “what has amounted to a technological revolution in a large number of 
wineries” (Gwynne, 2006). The replacement of indigenous beer brewing with industrialized 
production will lead to job losses in developing countries that will have an impact on the 
lower-income and female small-scale brewers (Haggblade, 1987) but will benefit those 
with the capital to invest in larger-scale production. 
Alcohol pricing policies and jobs in the alcohol sector
 From a health policy perspective, the most important factor is the effect of alcohol 
price increases on economic indicators. We can assume that any policy that reduces 
consumption will reduce revenue and, therefore, both value added and employment in that 
sector. If we crudely assume that employment is linearly related to output at the margins, 
then a 10% reduction in global alcohol consumption would lead to a 10% reduction in 
global employment and value added. Using the previously mentioned employment estimate 
of 1.5 million jobs worldwide, this translates to approximately 150 000 jobs lost in alcohol 
production globally. This does not mean that the unemployment rate will increase by 150 
000 jobs; the money saved on alcohol will be spent on other goods and services, and the 
same crude assumptions suggest that 150 000 jobs will be created elsewhere in the 
global economy. 
 What this illustrates is the probable scale of adjustments that would need to be 
made following a 10% reduction in alcohol consumption. In practice, the possibility of 
adjustment depends on the scale of adjustment and on the speed of the consumption 
change and several industry-specific factors. Workers with transferable skills and 
low-skilled workers will find adjustment easier than workers with specialist skills that 
cannot be used in alternative employment. For instance, the decline in brewing workers 
in the United Kingdom - primarily due to productivity increases - occurred among specialized 
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brewing operatives to a greater extent than among the transferable administrative and 
clerical staff (Godfrey & Hartley, 1990). 
 Rapid changes in demand will have a certain degree of lag in their effects on 
employment, which will be considerably greater for countries where the legal framework 
protects labour. One model from the United Kingdom has suggested that a 1% reduction 
in beer output leads to a 1% decrease in brewing employment in the long term, but only 
a 0.4% decrease in employment in the first quarter following the drop in output (Godfrey 
& Hartley, 1990). 
 Countries that export most of their drinks production and rely substantially on 
alcoholic drink exports to generate foreign capital will suffer most from a global decline 
in consumption, particularly if there is no available alternative use for the land and labour. 
Only Moldova and Saint Lucia depend on alcohol exports to a similar extent as Malawi and 
Zimbabwe’s dependence on tobacco (Jacobs et al., 2000; Warner, 2000), but in all these 
cases any decline in demand will cause significant problems. Policies that reduce domestic 
consumption will, however, have a lesser effect on the domestic industry given partial 
dependence on foreign markets. For example, because only 7% of cigarette production in 
Virginia is sold within the state, the simulated effect of a 19% reduction in tobacco spending 
is only 42 jobs, much less than if global demand had dropped by the same amount 
(Gottlob, 2004). 
 Large exporters will be relatively less affected by declines in domestic demand; 
however, this may lead to knock-on effects concerning their competitiveness in foreign 
markets (Booth & Weir, 1990). In particular, a significant reduction in the home market 
may reduce economies of scale and thereby increase unit costs, which could in turn reduce 
competitiveness in comparison to foreign producers. For example, one estimate has 
suggested that a tripling of beer output in the United Kingdom could reduce unit costs 
by 15% excluding taxes (Booth et al., 1990). An alternative assumption is that reduced 
domestic demand will increase the amount of drinks production for export, with this 
increased supply likely to depress rather than increase prices and lead to increased demand 
for exports (Wittwer & Anderson, 2002).
 Countries that import most of their drinks production are likely to see an improved 
balance of trade from both a global and a domestic decline in alcoholic drinks consumption. 
Because the majority of the drinks produced in the country are consumed domestically, 
however, the local alcoholic drinks industry will be sensitive to changes in domestic demand. 
 
 Countries that are high-consuming and self-sufficient with respect to alcoholic 
drinks production are likely to be the hardest hit by a decline in domestic consumption, 
although a decline in export markets will have no effect. Most countries trade large 
quantities of alcohol compared to other goods. This situation is increasingly common as 
the level of intra-industry trade that occurs for alcohol increases. This means that even 
countries that drink as much as they produce will trade considerable amounts of alcoholic 
drinks. A global decline in consumption would be detrimental to the export market but 
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have no effect on the balance of trade, whereas a certain share of any decline in domestic 
consumption would be “exported” because of the partial reliance on drinks imports.
Other parts of the supply chain
 The production of alcoholic drinks is only one part of the chain from raw materials 
to the final alcohol product sold to the consumer, and the other links are also associated 
with the generation of value and jobs. The RAND report (Horlings & Scoggins, 2006) 
mentions several sectors that are linked to alcoholic drinks at some stage, including inputs 
(such as malt, barley, hops and grapes), semi-manufacturers (bottles), services (transport 
and, particularly, advertising) and trade (retail, wholesale and catering). Globally, it is 
estimated that, while 30% of the cost of a bottle of wine goes to the winery, 37% goes 
to transporters, wholesalers and retailers (Anderson et al., 2003). The remainder goes 
to the government in the form of tax revenue. The extent of the links will vary depending 
on the context, such as the simple chains of traditional beer production in an African 
village compared to the more complex chains of developed countries (Jernigan, 2000).
 Alcohol pricing policies that reduce consumption will lead to reduced demand for 
agricultural inputs, with the option for farmers to adjust depending on the alternate uses 
for the crop, land, labour and capital investment. For inputs such as malting barley, the 
adjustment may be easier because existing barley output could be redirected to a variety 
of other uses. The situation is different for vines and hops, however, or for farmers who 
do not want to (or cannot) survive on a lower income by redirecting existing outputs. 
Farmers have the choice of either using the land to grow a less profitable alternative, or 
to leave farming altogether and pursue a different career (or to retire). 
 For individual countries, the effect of any alcohol policies will depend on the extent 
to which agricultural inputs to drinks production are imported rather than locally sourced. 
Raw materials are typically produced locally, particularly for traditional consumption in 
developing countries. However, for some drinks, such as lager in African countries, there 
is a need to import many ingredients, including barley (Kortteinen, 1989, cited in Room 
& Jernigan, 2000; Room, 2002).
Jobs in the retail sector with respect to alcohol
 Of all the sectors linked to alcohol, the retail and hospitality sectors are the most 
important to consider from a public health perspective, simply because the estimates of 
the economic significance of alcoholic drinks depend to a startling degree on these sectors. 
Using the Brewers of Europe estimates, the combined significance of beer production, 
agriculture, advertising and other beer supplier sectors in the EU was estimated at 
approximately 500 000 jobs. This is dwarfed by the estimated number of jobs in the 
retail and hospitality sectors at over 2 million – hence the importance of considering this 
sector in some detail. 
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 Internationally, the hotels, restaurants and catering sector (including bars) – widely 
known as the “HoReCa” sector – accounts for approximately 3% of GDP. This varies 
between countries depending on a range of factors, such as HoReCa’ s link to the level of 
tourism within a country. Using the United Nations Committee for Development Policy 
(UNCDP) data, the importance of HoReCa and retail/wholesale sectors does not appear 
to be linked to levels of development. In the EU, the highest levels of employment in 
HoReCa are 6-9 % of all jobs in Cyprus, Greece, Malta and Spain, whereas the lowest 
levels of employment are around 2% in Denmark and Poland (Bovagnet, 2005). The actual 
share of working time is likely to be lower than this, however, because part-time work is 
at relatively high levels in this sector (according to Eurostat, over 25% of all workers in 
this sector are part-time). The level may be even higher for pubs and bars, with 1990 
data from the United Kingdom suggesting that 75% of pub employees were part-time 
(Godfrey & Hartley, 1990). 
 Most of the economic contribution of these sectors is not linked to alcohol. The 
transition costs of the alcohol policy effect on the HoReCa and retail sectors will vary 
depending on the type of establishment. Those businesses that depend little on alcohol 
sales will be able to adjust easily to changes in alcohol sales, which will fall within the 
typically experienced sales fluctuations. Alcohol expenditures will be replaced by alternative 
spending; therefore, affected businesses will also see new areas of spending within their 
own stores (depending on the direction of this alternative spending), further reducing 
the transition costs. This explains the (relatively crude) research conducted in two states 
in the United States that found small, insignificant and negative relationships between 
cigarette sales and retail employment, where tobacco sales as a share of total retail sales 
value was similar to the share for alcohol in the United States (Gottlob, 2003; 2004). 
 In contrast, the businesses that depend primarily on alcohol sales – in practice, 
specialist alcohol retailers and bars – will be more affected by changes in alcohol sales, 
less likely to receive replacement spending and less able to adjust. Even for workers in 
these establishments, however, the work is low-skilled and poorly paid, and the transition 
to other low-skilled work incurs much lower transition costs than movement among 
higher-skilled, more specialized occupations.
 Using data from the United States, a 10% reduction in alcohol expenditure would 
be equivalent to a 9% reduction in specialist alcohol stores’ turnover, an 8% reduction in 
bars’ turnover, a 1.7% reduction in restaurants’ turnover, a 1.2% reduction in convenience 
stores’ turnover, and less than a 0.5% reduction in the turnover of supermarkets, hotels 
and limited-service restaurants (United States Census Bureau, 2005). If employment is 
linearly related to turnover at the margins, this is equivalent to an adjustment of around 
25,000 jobs in the retail sector (0.2% of total retail employment) and 90,000 jobs in the 
HoReCa sector (0.9% of total HoReCa employment). Many of these jobs will be part-time 
and, as the discussion suggests, the 35 000 jobs in specialist alcohol shops and bars will 
face much greater transition costs than the other 80,000 jobs.
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 However, the money formerly spent on alcohol will be spent elsewhere, including 
the retail sector. Simulations for tobacco typically find an increase in employment in the 
retail sector after a reduction in tobacco spending, a finding that is likely also to apply to 
alcohol. For example, a 25% cut in spending on tobacco in New South Wales was estimated 
to produce a 0.1% drop in retail employment before expenditure reallocation but, after 
spending reallocation, the change was either negligible or positive depending on the 
scenario (Junor et al., 2004). 
 The discussion has thus far assumed that any policy change would have an effect 
of an overall decrease in alcohol spending. In practice, many policies have effects on either 
the retail or HoReCa sectors, most obviously with licensing requirements. Even a policy 
such as taxation would be expected to have a differential impact on these sectors – HM 
Treasury analyses suggest that consumption in the United Kingdom off-trade is twice as 
price-sensitive in proportional terms as consumption in the on-trade, which makes it 
significantly more sensitive in absolute terms (Huang, 2003). This also implies that any 
given tax rise will increase the competitiveness of on-trade compared to the off-trade, 
although there are difficulties in accurately estimating cross-price elasticities. The sector 
relationships with alcohol are constantly changing, which lead to economic consequences 
of their own. In the United Kingdom, for example, the increasing use of below-cost alcohol 
sales in supermarkets as “loss-leaders” has taken its toll on the price-sensitive sales of 
specialist alcohol retailers. 
Other sectors
 Several sectors linked to the production and sale of alcoholic drinks have not been 
considered in this paper. These include utilities, packaging, equipment, transport and 
other services (e.g. payroll services), which together have been estimated by the Brewers 
of Europe to include 100 000 jobs linked to beer in the EU. Of these sectors, the majority 
are not specialized and, therefore, are subject to the same considerations as retail and 
advertising (e.g. transport). Some sectors – such as equipment manufacturers – may be 
more specialized and subject to greater transition costs. For instance, approximately 25% 
of domestic demand in the Scottish packaging and glass industries was estimated to be 
a response to the Scotch whisky industry (Booth & Weir, 1990), whereas 15% of can 
companies’ total volume and total glass demand in the United States is estimated to come 
from Anheuser-Busch. One problem in obtaining statistics on these sectors is that some 
functions may be done “in-house”; for example, over half of the employment in the Scotch 
whisky industry in 1978 was in blending and bottling plants, complicating analyses of 
external linkages.
 Finally, many industry studies such as that commissioned by the Brewers of Europe 
include induced employment associated with alcohol production. This can be thought of 
as the economic impacts already mentioned. For example, the farm production that feeds 
into alcoholic drinks production may require capital equipment, which generates expenditure 
elsewhere in the economy. The Ernst & Young (2006) study accounts for this by multiplying 
the indirect impact by 50%, which they present as the average second-round effects in 
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the EU economy and find this adds 120 000 to their estimate of beer-attributable 
employment in the EU. In the tobacco sector, the industry-commissioned estimates use 
generous multipliers (Godfrey & Hartley, 1990; Jacobs et al., 2000), although no alternative 
estimates have been done with respect to alcohol that would enable comparisons.
 
 While calculating the induced employment is a technically sound procedure – see 
Zhang (2002) for a description – the amount of the transition costs for induced employment 
will be negligible because the same induced employment will be generated by the 
replacement spending (Jacobs et al., 2000).4  As Arthur Anderson Economic Consulting 
notes for tobacco, these are jobs that “are not in the tobacco industry, do not supply or 
serve the tobacco industry, and do not relate to tobacco in any other way” (Arthur Andersen 
Economic Consulting, 1993).
 
 Table 4.1 provides a summary of probable transition costs in different sectors, 
assuming a fall in alcohol consumption.
4 The tobacco simulations above show that this is an approximation; some sectors benefit and others lose 
in the long-run expenditure reallocations. However, given that these adjustments will be distributed over 
the whole economy – unlike the concentration of alcohol sales in particular retailers, for instance – it is 
reasonable to treat these induced estimates as correct but not important for policy.
Table 4.1.  Summary of probable transition costs from the perspective of each sector 
within a given country
Production
Agriculture
Advertising
Retail and HoReCa
Rest of the 
economy
Details
Crudely estimated at 1.5 million 
people; many relatively 
specialized; threatened by 
productivity improvements
Unknown size; almost entirely 
dependent on potential 
alternate uses for land; likely to 
be harder for vine growers 
than barley farmers
Small but high value added; 
sector as a whole not depen-
dent on alcohol revenue
Largest number of jobs 
dependent on alcohol revenues 
(mainly in HoReCa); mainly 
low-skilled
Consumers’ spending on other 
goods will increase employ-
ment, with the economy overall 
likely to see a negligible net 
effect in the long term
Domestic decline
Potentially difficult to 
adjust; less difficult if 
more production is 
exported
Dependent on production 
changes
Potentially affected; 
adjustment unknown but 
unlikely to be significant
Specialist retailers hardest 
hit; adjustment costs likely 
to be low-to-moderate
Global decline
Potentially difficult to 
adjust; more difficult if 
more production is 
exported
Dependent on production 
changes
No effect
No effect
No effect
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Conclusion
 If people spend less money on alcohol but more money on other goods, this will 
create jobs elsewhere in the economy. In the long run, most economists would expect the 
effect on employment to be effectively zero. The costs that should be considered, therefore, 
are the adjustment costs in the medium and short term – i.e. over a few years.
 A considerable number of people are employed in the production of alcoholic drinks 
worldwide – perhaps as many as 1.5 million people. This employment will continue to 
decrease as drinks companies invest in productivity improvements, particularly in developing 
countries. Adjustment costs in this sector will depend on the situation within a given 
country, and will be lower for slow declines in consumption than for rapid declines. A 
greater number of jobs are linked with alcohol in other sectors such as the retail, hotels, 
restaurants and catering sectors. Adjustment costs will be much lower in these sectors 
than for drinks production. Whether these adjustment costs are borne within the country 
experiencing a consumption decline depends on the extent to which their output is 
exported, and the extent to which imported drinks are consumed.
 Alcohol causes economic societal costs - including those associated with health 
care, police (including courts and prisons), crime prevention, property damage, traffic 
accident damage, workplace productivity, unemployment and premature mortality. Alcohol 
may also be related to the considerable cost of HIV/AIDS in some countries. Alcohol policies 
are likely to decrease costs in these areas and these cost reductions are likely to outweigh 
any potential economic disadvantages of alcohol pricing policies (Anderson, 2012).
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Pricing policies and other alcohol control policies
 A final form of economic analysis is to compare the cost-effectiveness of different 
alcohol policies. The cost-effectiveness studies below do not include the various economic 
impacts above – they consider only the costs of implementing the policy itself, set against 
the (health) benefits that they are likely to provide. The possibilities of more encompassing 
forms of cost - benefit analysis are discussed elsewhere (see Baumberg, 2010).
 An analysis of the intervention costs (1 international dollar per 1 million population 
per year), intervention effects, (DALYs lost per 1 million population per year), and the 
average cost-effectiveness ratio (CER) (1 international dollar per DALY lost) have been 
calculated for different WHO regions of the world (Chisholm et al., 2004). Table 4.2 shows 
the results for 12 subregions of the WHO regions of Africa, the Americas, Europe, South-East 
Asia and the Western Pacific. Combining costs and effects data (Table 4.2) reveals that, 
relative to the situation of doing nothing, taxation is the most cost-effective strategy in 
six of the subregions with a high prevalence of heavy drinkers (each DALY averted by 
current taxation costs 100-600 international dollars, and 90-500 international dollars if 
taxation rates are increased by 50%). Of the remaining population strategies, advertising 
bans “dominated” restricted access to sales outlets with greater effect, but cost less to 
implement, whereas random breath-testing had the highest cost per DALY averted (in the 
range of 650-4500 international dollars). Extensive treatment coverage (50%) of heavy 
drinkers with brief physician advice had an average CER of 400-2500 international dollars.
 In the other six subregions, taxation was the most cost-effective in the Western 
Pacific subregion WprA (but at a less favourable ratio of costs to effects; 1368 international 
dollars), but not elsewhere. Random breath-testing was the most cost-effective strategy 
where rates of hazardous alcohol use are very low (South-East Asia; average CER 420-
550 international dollars), brief advice was most cost-effective in the African subregion 
AfrD and American subregion AmrD (CER 600-700 international dollars), while advertising 
bans or restricted access to sales outlets had the lowest expected costs per healthy life 
year gained in the Western Pacific subregion WprB (200-250 international dollars per 
DALY averted).
 Specific intervention strategies are not implemented in isolation, but should be 
combined to maximize possible health gains up to the point at which it remains affordable 
to do so (Anderson et al., 2009). The best possible mix of interventions at different 
spending limits will depend on the relative cost and cost-effectiveness of the individual 
components and on the interactions that exist between them. The final set of values in 
Table 4.2 show incremental CERs in relation to the current tax situation. The incremental 
CERs for increased taxation rates are modelled to equal zero because estimated costs of 
implementation (relative to the situation of no taxation) are the same as those for current 
taxation (i.e. additional health gains are achieved at negligible extra cost). In subregions 
with a higher prevalence of hazardous alcohol use, moving away from, or adding to, taxation 
policies alone (e.g. by also implementing an advertising ban and/or brief advice in 
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primary care) carries an incrementally greater cost per DALY averted as less cost-effec-
tive interventions are implemented. In the European subregion EurA, for instance, the 
incremental CER for adding an advertising ban to alcohol taxation would be close to 300 
international dollars (not much more than the 258 international dollars for taxation alone), 
but 1700 international dollars if brief advice was also made widely available. In subregions 
with low rates of hazardous drinking, interventions other than taxation are either dominant 
(i.e. they have lower costs but greater effects than current taxation) or have a more 
favourable CER (e.g. the incremental CER for moving from current taxation to roadside 
breath-testing in South-East Asia is 50-150 international dollars, well below the CER of 
the 200-4000 international dollars for the current taxation).
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Chapter 4.4
Earmarked tax
Esa Österberg, Bundit Sornpaisarn
 Revenue from taxes on alcohol is typically applied to the general government 
accounts. There is no requirement that this revenue will be spent on reducing or meeting 
the costs of alcohol-related harms, although it can contribute to police and justice budgets, 
offsetting costs arising from alcohol-related traffic crashes or alcohol-related crime and 
public disorder. As general revenue, it also offsets public health and health-care costs 
arising from alcohol-related disease and injury. The implementation and enforcement of 
effective alcohol policies, including collection of excise duties, incur their own costs and 
may be perceived as expensive if they are competing for budgets against the full range 
of government services, rather than viewed separately in an alcohol cost-benefit analysis. 
Government revenue, however, is not linked to government spending, and spending will 
relate to alcohol only if it is a policy priority.
 Consideration can be given to dedicating a proportion of alcohol excise duties, or 
a separate levy on alcohol, to alcohol control, health promotion and harm prevention 
activities. Three keywords should be addressed: dedicated tax, earmarked tax, and 
surcharged tax. The WHO technical manual on tobacco tax administration defines dedicated 
tax as a budget committed by the government but no similar legislation is required, 
whereas earmarked tax is committed by law. With this definition, the earmarked tax is 
more difficult to collect but is more reliable and more sustainable when the law is passed 
compared to a dedicated tax. Vathesatogkit (2013), author of Health promotion fund: 
sustainable financing and governance, defines surcharged tax and earmarked tax separately. 
In his definition, earmarked tax refers to a government determination of a proportion of 
the existing excise tax revenue to become a budget supporting health promotion activities, 
whereas surcharged tax refers to government collection of extra excise tax revenue by 
determining an additive proportion of the existing excise tax revenue. The author argues 
that finance ministries tend to accept surcharged tax more than earmarked tax because 
the government budget is not affected by this type of tax. 
 In a number of countries, governments earmark taxes on alcoholic beverages for 
health promotion purposes (i.e. as a dedicated tax) (Carol, 2004). The earliest version of 
a dedicated tax was a tobacco tax implemented in Western Australia in 1983, which was 
followed by the implementation of a dedicated tobacco tax in the Australian state of 
Victoria in 1987 (Carol, 2004). Since 1983, other countries have implemented dedicated 
tobacco taxes, and some countries have implemented dedicated alcohol taxes. In 2000, 
Estonia implemented a dedicated alcohol tax of 3.5%, and in 2001 Thailand implemented 
a surcharged alcohol and tobacco tax of 2% (devoted to health promotion funding, see 
box 4.1) (Carol, 2004). The Taiwan Health Promotion Foundation was set up in 2001 and 
receives budgets from fixed rates per pack of tobacco excise tax, which were US$ 0.17 
in 2002, US$ 0.33 in 2006 and US$ 0.67 in 2009 (Vathesatogkit et al., 2013). The Mongolian 
Health Promotion Foundation, established in 2007, has budgets composed of 2% from 
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tobacco excise tax, 1% from alcohol excise tax, and 2% from drug registration. The Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic’s Tobacco Control Fund, established in 2013, obtains its bud-
gets from 2% of profit tax from tobacco business operators and 200 Lao Kip per cigarette 
package from all locally manufactured and imported tobacco products. The Viet Nam 
Tobacco Control Fund, established in 2013, obtains budgets from 1% of the factory price 
of all cigarette packs consumed in Viet Nam (Vathesatogkit et al., 2013).
Box 4.1. The establishment of the ThaiHealth Promotion Foundation using a surcharged 
tax from alcohol and tobacco excise taxes
 ThaiHealth Promotion Foundation (ThaiHealth) is a semi-governmental organization 
in Thailand (Vathesatogkit et al., 2013). It was established when Thailand’s parliament enacted 
the Thai Health Promotion Foundation Act (B.E.2544) in 2001. ThaiHealth is not part of the 
Ministry of Public Health, but is under the supervision of the Prime Minister directly. The 
foundation’s budget comes from a 2% surcharge levied on excise tax from alcohol and tobacco 
producers. This type of funding mechanism is the most effective means of securing sustainable 
and long-term funding support for health promotion activities in the country. 
 ThaiHealth, using its budget, is a catalyst for the coordination and empowerment of 
all partner organizations collectively to promote the health of Thai people (Adulyanon, 2012). 
ThaiHealth and its alliances employ healthy policy advocacy strategies, mass media campaigns 
and community mobilization to advocate for the promotion of health for all Thai people. The 
success of the alcohol control policy advocacy is illustrated by the number of national alcohol 
policies in Thailand, which increased from one policy per eight years between 1950 and 2001 
to two policies per year during the period of 2003-2008. The “collective impact” of the works 
of ThaiHealth and its alliances includes a reduction in the prevalence of excessive alcohol 
drinkers from 9.1% in 2004 to 7.3% in 2009, a decline in adult smoking from 25.5% in 2001 
to 20.7% in 2009, and a reduction in the traffic fatality rate from 22.9 per 100,000 population 
in 2003 to 16.8 per 100,000 in 2010.
 The examples of dedicated taxes that fund, in part, VicHealth and Healthway in 
Australia, the Korean Health Promotion Fund in Korea, and ThaiHealth in Thailand 
demonstrate that earmarking of taxes to be used by health promotion foundations can 
substantially enhance the health promotion activities in a country (Slama, 2006). 
Accordingly, because of this increased funding, dedicated alcohol taxes may be more 
effective than non-dedicated alcohol taxes (Slama, 2006). 
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